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CHAPTER IV

. 'REASONABLE USES OF OUTER SPACE

fy" .::>_ ·{~ .' .I
A. THE NATURE OF REASONABLE USE

. ~Ia:fikind . is intent upon exploring a_? d . using outer space_ and
celestial b6dies. He is, ho\vever, still endeavoring to arrive ·a t decisions· as to how such are·as may be used. From the legal point of
view the problem presented is tl~is: 1.!nder what conditions n1ay a
great variety of uses and exploratory activities be carried on?
Further, \Vhat, if any, uses or activities lnay not be engaged in at.
any ti1ne? Finally, what, if any, uses or activities general.l y pernlitted may be occasionally prohibited, and, conversely, what, if any,
~ses g~nerally prohibited may be occasionally permitted? When the
proble1n is posed in this fashion, it becomes immediately clear that
£he._ultin1ate test of the use and exploration of outer space ~becon1es
one of reasonableness, and, more particularly, reasonableness in
the s·pecific factual context of · a. given situation. The. principle of
teasonable uses implies the itnportance of control for such uses.
Patterns of reasonableness have already been developing in th_e
il~ternationalla\v of outer space. The fqrces which have contributed
to a verbal consensus respecting son1e uses and activities, like the·.
:forces \vhich have contributed to the development of a limited customary international la\v of outer space, have been based upon
practical considerations. This attitude to,vard reasonable, and therefore legal, conduct has stemmed fro1n .the same social conlp~ex,."
in<;!udil)g the forces of practice and usage, which has provided nian
\vith a customary international law of outer space. Further, theparticular consensus achieved in the United Nations concerning the
substance of draft proposals is indicative of standards of reasonable
conduct in the space age·. Illustrative of this point are the seve1~al
drafts relating to liability for damages caused by space devices,
rights available to personnel and space vehicles in the event of an
emergency landing, and common basic principles contained in theseveral draft declarations and international agree1nents dealt \vith
in Chapter III. 1
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Reasonableness of use of outer space and celestial bodies at this
time depends on four major legal factors. 1'he first is the existing
customary international la 'v of outer space. 2 The second is the
unanimous General Assen1bly Resolutions 1721 ( X'li) of December
20, 1961, 1802 (XVII) of Decmnber 19, 1962, and 1962 (XVIII)
of Dece1nber 24, 1963. All have incorporated and promulgated customary international legal principles. The third is the unanimous
General Assembly Resolution 1884 (XVIII) of October 17, 1963,
which endeavored to forestall the positioning of weapons of mass
destruction in outer space. 3 The fourth is the 1963 ~foscow Treaty
banning nuclear weapons testing. 4 These factors are significantly
influenced by wide-ranging international legal discussions and the
''Titings of legal specialists. 5 Furthern1ore, they have, in an analytical sense, made provision for the free .use of ot~ter space for. p~aceful,
i.e., nonaggressive and beneficial, purposes. By direct provision and
by implication they place li1nitations upon the free use of outer
space for nonconforming uses. In this Inanner so1ne lilnits are
placed on national uses of this environment.
However, " . hen the concept of national control enters the picture
it brings with it both affirmative and negative aspects. Thus, free2

su.pra, p. 44.

a This Resolution provided: "The General Assembly, Recalling its Resolution
1721 A (XVI) of 20 December 1961, in which it expressed the belief that the
exploration and use of outer space should be only for the· betterment of mankind,
"Determined to take steps to preYent the spread of the arms race to outer
space,
"1. lVelcomes the expressions by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and the United States of America of their intention not to station in outer
space any objects carrying nuclear weapons or other kinds of weapons of mass
destruction ;
"2. Solemnly calls upon all States:
"(a) To refrain from placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, installing such weapons on celestial bodies, or stationing such weapons in outer
space in any other manner;
"(b) To refrain from causing, encouraging or in any w~y participating in
the conduct of the foregoing activities." U.N. Doc. A/5571; A/RES/1884
(XVIII); U.N. Doc. A/C.1/L.324.
Background data is contained in "Report of Conference of Eighteen-Nation
Committee on Disarmament," United Nations Review 42-43 (October 1963).
The United States position was indicated by Ambassador SteYenson on October
16, 1963. See "U.N. Calls on States to Refrain from Orbiting 'Yeapons," 49
Department of State Bulletin 753 (Xovember 1963).
4 40 Department of State Bulletin 239 (1963). Infra, p. 301.
5 Compare the writings of Cooper, Gardner, Haley, .J. A. Johnson, I~asswell,
Lipson, ~IcDougal, Vlasic in Authors' Index.
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don1 of outer space for peaceful uses means freedon1 from unilateral
.control so long as the users conduct their activities in a reasonable
1nanner. Put in other words, the right of free use depends upon
reasonableness of that use, ~nd imposes a duty upon users not to
engage in unreasonable activities. Further, the right of free and
reasonable use relieves a state from the duty of not interfering in
uses by others 'vhen the specific uses by others become so unreasonable-as in the case of the intentional use of outer space or celestial
bodies for aggressive military purposes-as to occasion valid concern
for international peace, international security, and the requirements
of legitimate self-defense. 6
"\Ve see then, that in the context of reasonableness-including
both freedom to use and freedom from uses-control assumes an
ilnportance of substantial proportion. ~Iankind's interest in the
fullest exploitation of the space din1ension must not fail to take
into account the proper expectation that he will not be made the
subject of unreasonable harms emanating from the heavens. This
situation has been interpreted by Johnson in the following language:
The area within 'vhich the underlying State possesses the
right to 'veto' the activity of another State must not be permitted to extend to altitudes which would hamper the freedom
of space exploration. It is of little value to speak of the freedom
of outer space if man cannot travel freely to that realm and
freely back to earth. 7
In seeking to restrict outer space for reasonable uses, international
la 'v n1ay proceed along several paths. None has received final and
authoritative approval, and the problems which face the developing
la'v of outer space are those which have long confronted the whole
gamut of the law. rr'hese separate approaches can best be stated in
the form of interrogations. First, is all human activity in outer
space permissible pending the imposition of legal restrictions-from
'vhatever source derived? This assumes that any conduct is perInissible until valid prohibitions ·exist and have been generally
ackno,vledged as binding. Or, is no human activity in outer space
pern1issible unless and until sound legal sources provide adequate
guidance as to its permissibility? In the first situation an answerbut not necessarily the correct answer-has been that international
law's entire coverage extended into outer space even before the
Whether the reaction to unreasonable uses may be collective or individual
is not being considered at this point.
7 Johnson, "The Future of Manned Space Flight, and the 'Freedom' of Outer
Space," NASA News Release, August 4, 1962, pp. 14-15.
6

266
launching -of the first orbiting satellite and that the general law
existing at that ti1ne 'vas not violated by that experience. Another
ans,ver is that because of the uniqueness of the environ1nent, only
son1e of the existing legal principles could have application in outer
space. In the second situation an answer-and again not necessarily
the correct ans,ver-has been that 1nan's actua!" conduct precedes
la,v, whether customary or express.: These questions raise :false issues.
by their inclusiveness, e.g., "all" or "no" human activity. Still, the·
basic issue, as presented to the 'Vorld Court in the Lot1l8 O~e,
requires analysis so that doubt concerning legal ·rights in· outer
space 1nay be put aside. 8
_
It 'vill be recalled that in the Lotus Oase, it 'vas argued by France
that under international law·, France should exercise exclusive jurisdiction over its national because past ·practices pointed to a valid
rule having this legal effect. The govern1nent of France also urged
that Turkey n1ight exercise jurisdiction only if it were able to point
to a then existing and applicable rule of international law permitting
a trial in Turkey. The Court held, ·in effect, that international ·law
\vas not all enco1npassing-that there was no existing or ap'plicable·
rule restricting or denying th~ exe1;cise. of jurisdiction by _Turkey.
It was concluded -that the co11duct oi ·Turkey \Vas not violative of
international la'v in the absence of a rule prohibiting Tur~ey~s
exercise of jurisdiction, and, finally, ·that ·the exercise of jurisdiction
by Turkey was appropriate.
Ho,Yever, the holding in the Lotus Oase that international law
i's not all-inclusive and that it has prohibited only that which in
fact is so expressed 1nust be applied ·reasonably and in context to
the free and peaceful use of outei~ ; space. It must be kept in mind
that custo1nary international law is ·out one part of international
la'v and that its utility generally is to give legal approval to reasonable and measurable past practices of a1i affir1native type. Thus~
its value lies largely in giving approval to existing practices which
protect property and commercial· values. Yet, at the s~l!ne tilne,.
custon1 has its other face. By not approving aggressive conduct, it
tends to inhibit or negate the legality of such behavior. 1-\..lthough
customary international la '"" has lacked the resources to deny, in an
express and affirmative 1nanner, the 11se of outer space for aggressi,~e
.

.

s The S.S. Lotus (France v~ Turkey), P.O.I ..J., Ser. A, No. 10; 2 Hudson,
W orld Court Reports 20 (1935). This case held that a state's wide measure of
discretion is subject to existing legal prohibit~ons ax:d that .only where such
prohibitions were lacking might "every state remain free to adopt the prin·
ciples which it regards as best and most suitable.;'
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and nonbeneficial purposes, one may not conclude that such aggressive and nonbeneficial uses are therefore either reasonable or permissible. One 1nust look to the substantive content of international law
.as contained in its broad principles and rules to support the con·c lusion that aggressive international conduct is unlawful in all
·environments. 9 This view is clearly valid and is upheld by both
.general international la·w· and by such express international agreements as the Charter of the United Nations and by the 1\:elloggBriand Pact of 1928.
The Lotus Oase does not constitute a precedent in favor of unre·stricted national uses and activities in outer space. It is by no'v much
too late to doubt the availability and the applicability of kno,vn
international legal principles to the use and exploration of outer
·space and celestial bodies. This "\Yas generally regarded to be true
prior to the adoption of Resolution 1721 (XVI). The Resolution,
in relying on general international la "\Y and on the Charter of the
United Nations, makes this fact explicit. Ho,vever, since international law does not consist of a detailed and all-encompassing set
·of prohibitions, admittedly where this form of law has not yet
·developed, a state may engage in such specific activities as do not
fall within prohibitory principles and rules. As to such specific
forms of national conduct, a state may engage in reasonable conduct
until inhibited by clearly established principles and rules of inter1lational la "\Y.
In vie'v of the foregoing, and as related to specific types of space
·conduct, it is possible to assert in the course of the development of a
satisfactory law of outer space that reasonable space activities may
be regarded as per1nissible until prohibited. This is true where
such activities are peaceful, e.g., nonaggressive and beneficial. The
·other presu1nption, suggested by so1ne, is that in the absence of a
-detailed and enco1npassing set of legal prohibitions, all forms of
space activity are permissible unless and until the sources of inter1lational la'v indicate the invalidity of such conduct.
This apparent conflict in method of approach, and consequent
divergence in the governance of space activities, has, in fact, already
been resolved. The key is the developing pattern of reasonableness
as to space uses and activities. Thus, if it is contended that free
and peaceful uses of outer space are illegal until specifically permitted, it can be stated that the principle of permissibility for
peaceful uses has been determined by general customary international la'v and Resolution 1721 (XVI). On the other hand, if it is
9

Eastern· Extension, etc. Tcleg1·ap1t Co. Ltd., Kielsen's Report 7G ( 1910).
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argued that space activity is pern1issible until prohibited by a specific and express rule of international law, reference may be had
to the 1963 :\Ioscow Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and to the General
...~sse1nbly Resolution 1884 (XVIII). It 1nay also be noted that this
\ie'' has never been carried to the point where it is assumed that
conduct of any and all kinds-in particular, intentionally aggressi\e
acti\ity-·was thought to have the approval of international la,Y.
In fact, outer space is not a legal vacuum, and general principles
of law as a part of international law have been recognized in General . A.ssembly Resolution 1721 (X\TI) as applying to conduct in
outer space and on celestial bodies.
The contest between per1nissible and nonper1nissible conduct 1nust
be resolved in a structured space la'' regi1ne by the concept of reasonableness. X o brief need be filed on behalf of the merits of the
concept of reasonableness, except to say that such a doctrine is
based upon reciprocal benefits and on a generalized ongoing mutuality of interest. Reasonableness emphasizes the essential values of a
world con1n1unity of interests, and when conditioned by acceptable
international tolerances provides the basis for effective and cooperative international relations. One of the greatest virtues of the concept of reasonableness is that it does not seek to provide ultin1ate
answers in advance of constantly modifying problems. In the context
of the space age, the value of the concept of reasonableness will be
1neasured against its record of ser\ice to the dynamic and continuing
needs and aspjrations of n1ankind.
B. INSTANCES OF REASONABLE USE
In view of the fact that space capabilities are properly regarded
as ele1nents of national strength and prestige, and in vie'v of the
constant co1npetition an1ong and bet,veen nations for leadership,
power, prestige, and security, it should not be surprising that there
is not a con1plete consensus a1nong nations as to the reasonableness
of all uses of space devices. Or, perhaps it is not surprising that
there has been quite general agreen1ent that many space uses 1nay
be regarded as reasonable. But, this is always subject to the reservation that under certain circun1stances uses which n1ight generally
be regarded as reasonable 1nay beco1ne unreasonable. This is true
because the complex qualities of spac~ devices are such as to enable
them to be used in 1nany instances for quite varied purposes. The
United States has frequently insjsted that this fact must be taken
into account in the developn1ent of space la".,.· Thus, Senator Gore
told the First Con11nittee of the United X ations in Dece1nber 1962,
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"There is, in any event no 'vorkable dividing-line between military
and non1nilitary uses of space. For instance, both American and
Russian astronauts are members of the armed forces of their respective countries; but this is no reason to challenge their activities or
or to deprecate their accomplishments. A navigation satellite in
outer space can guide a submarine as well as a merchant ship. The
instruments which guide a space vehicle on a scientific mission can
also guide a space vehicle on a military mission." 10
The state exists for a variety of purposes. Among then1 it seeks to
protect its citizens and its ongoing existence, and in order to do so
it utilizes the n1ost modern scientific and technological equipment
kno,vn to 1nan. The n1anner in ·which such devices are employed
depends upon n1an's intent, expectations, and the surrounding factual
circu1nstances. Thus, such devices may be used for peaceful purposes.
Yet in many situations they n1ay also have utility for the carrying
on of "-rar. Nonmilitary uses, it may be assumed, are peaceful ones.
On the other hand, it does not folio"~ that military uses need be nonpeaceful ones, for the function of a 1nilitary use 1nay be to provide
infor1nation or data in such a 'vay as to deter or prevent the outbreak
of 'var. Peaceful, and hence reasonable uses of outer space, may inelude 1nilitary uses ''hen the latter are nonaggressive and beneficial
in their purpose. Therefore, it 1nay be concluded that the reasonableness of space activity is deter1nined not so much by the possible
1nilitary uses or capabilities of space devices, but, rather, by the nonexistence of aggressive intent or by the absence of unpeaceful circumstances. Peaceful uses n1ay be converted into unreasonable uses
by means of aggressive military en1ploy1nent. 11
U.N. Doc. A/0.1/PV.12~~' 13.
Feldman has traced the early meaning assigned to the term "peaceful,'t
and has concluded that in United States n1unicipal law and in international law
it means "nonaggressive" rather than "nonn1ilitary." Feldman, "The Report of
the United Nations Legal Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space:
A Provisional Appraisal," Second Oolloquitun 23-24 (1960). In his view the
foregoing meaning "also appears to be the most reasonable interpretation."
Ibid. The problem of defining aggression has been noted by Stone, Aggression
and World Order 201-217 (1958) and by the International Law Commission.
Compare Sohn, "The Definition of Aggression," 45 Virginia La1p Review 697
(1959). 'Vriters on international law have generally regarded peaceful uses
to consist of nonaggressive uses. Thus, l\feyer bas stated that "In my opinion
the term 'peaceful' must be understood in the sense of 'nonaggressive.'" l\feyer,
"Legal Problems of Outer Space," 28 The Journal of Air Law and Oomrnerce341 (1962). He bas also stated "To interpret the term 'peaceful' in the se11se
of 'nonmilitary' would lead to the consequence that no military action could
1
0
11
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The pri1nary test of aggressive purpose is intent. 12 Ho,vever, the
context in 'vhich the intent is for1nulated also materially affects the
concept of peacefulness and reasonableness of purpose. 13
Recent discussions at the United Nations have endeavored to make
it clear that "peaceful" means "nonaggressive." Thus, the Belgian
representative told the legal subcommittee of the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space that "the term 'peaceful' in the ComJnittee's title 'vas the antonym of 'aggressive' and not of 'military.'" 14
The Japanese representative has also contrasted peaceful w·ith aggressiYe. He told the subcommittee in April 1963, that "The basic
the1ne of the la 'v of outer space n1ust be that outer space should be
used for peaceful purposes only and that its use for aggressive purposes such as nuclear testing or the. placing of 'veapons of 1nass
destruction in orbit should be prohibited." 15
The Italian delegate told the subco1n1nittee at the ·saine ti1ne that
"the 1nost urgent issue "~as the banning of all activities of an aggresbe 'peaceful.' But such an interpretation would be in contradiction to all pract ice." Ibid.
Compare also Kittrie, " 'Aggressive' Uses of Space Vehicles-the Remedies
1n International Law," Fourth Golloquizun 198-219 (1961) ; 'Vright, "Legal Aspects of the U-2 Incident," 54 A.J.I.L. 846-847 (1960) ; Beresford, "Surveillance
Aircraft and Satellites: A Proble1u of International Law," 27 The Journal of
Air Law and Gornmm·ce 108-109 (1960) ; 'Velsh, · "Peaceful Purposes: Some
Realistic Definitions," 1961 Air Force and Space Digest 73 (November 1961).
Crane has noted the manner in which the Soviets have employed "aggres:Sion" in space discussions. He has said "The fourth element of peaceful coexistence emphasized by the Soviet representative to the U.N. Space Committee
is the principle of nonaggression. The term 'aggression' is used by the Soviets
to stigmatize any military, political, or economic action or alleged preparation
for such action which is adverse to Soviet strategic interests." Crane, "Basic
Principles in U.S. Space Policy," 22 Federal Bar Journa.l 175 (1{)62).
12 Halle, in Goldsen, ed., International Political Implications of Activities in
·Outer Space 88 (1960).
13 Illustrations have been given by Halle and Schelling. The former has in-<licated that the emplacement of a satellite above a country might be regarded
as peaceful, but that the positioning of a satellite containing a ' weapon of mass
·destruction above a state "is such a threatening gesture that it is intolerable."
'Schelling has noted that "One n1ight try to make an arbitrary distinction between military related activities and nonmilitary related activities in such
things as communication, which is obviously borderline." Ibid., 89~
l\IcDougal, Lasswell and Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space 304-306
(19G3), have noted that reasonableness must take Into account the factor of
-claims to occasional exclusive competence to use an environment which normally would be open to the peaceful use of an.
14 U.N. Doc. A/ AC.105/C.2/SR.19, 4.
1 5 U.l.r. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.22, 10-11.
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sive nature in ·outer space:" 16 During the same period, ~Ir. ~Ieeker;
United States Department of State representative on the subcommittee, stated "For several years the United States has consistently ad-·
hered to the vie'v that outer space should be used for peaceful-that
is, nonaggressive and beneficial-purposes. Ho,vever, pending the·
achieven1ent of disarmament agreements, the test of any space activity cannot be 'vhether it is military or nonmilitary, but 'vhether it is.
consistent with the United Nations Charter and other obligations of
internationalla"\\""." 17
Not all of the representatives on the subcommittee agreed. The
Czech delegate told the group in .A. pril 1963, that his country 'vished
to prohibit the use of outer space for espionage and for the dissemination of \Var propaganda, but that he had "some doubts regardingthe need for a provision prohibiting the use of outer space for 'var
purposes. \Vhile it sympathized with the objective, it believed that
the question was outside the Sub-Comn1ittee's tern1s of reference.
Moreover, the provisions of Article 2 ( 4) of the Charter and of
operative paragraph 1 (a) of General Assembly Resolution 1721
(XVI) appeared to cover the question that was involved." 18 Thus,.
the Czech delegate, it \Vould appear, \Vas more concerned that outer
space should not be used for warlike purposes, for "espionage" as.
he understood it, or for \var propaganda than for its not being used
for aggressive purposes.
The general tenor of legal opinion at the United Nations has been
to consider that outer space, celestial bodies, and devices positioned
there should not be used for aggressive purposes, and that nonaggressive n1ilitary purposes \Vere 'vithin the range of peaceful purposes ..
.A..t present, nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space,
and under,vater, and the storing of \Yeapons of 1nass destruction in
16

U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 20, 4.

1\feeker, "Observation in Space," Departnwnt of State Press Relea8e, No.
191 (Revised), April 12, 1963, p. 6. Senator Gore in December 1962, had stated
at the First Committee: "It is the view of the United States that outer space
should be used only for peaceful-that is, nonaggressive and beneficial-purposes. The question of military activities in space cannot be divorced from the
question of military activities on earth. To banish these activities in both
environn1ents we n1ust continue our efforts for general and complete disarmament with adequate safeguards. Until this is achieved, the test of any
space activity must be not whether it is military or nonmilitary, but whether
or not it is consistent with the United Nations Charter and other obligations.
of international law." U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1289, 13.
18
U.N. Doc. A/ AC.l05/C.2/SR.20, 9. However, the Hungarian representatiYe
bas urged that peac.eful uses must be both "nonmilitary and nonaggressiye
* * *" U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.26, 4.
17
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()Uter space do not fall \vithin the range of per1nitted legal uses. The
United States has stated on a nlnnber of occasions that it has no intent to place \Yea pons of mass destruction in space, and has consistently invited the Soviet Union to conform to the same policy. 19
Before turning to a further analysis of reasonable uses of outer
space it is necessary to call attention to the problem of gaining access
to and of returning fron1 outer space. This involv·es ingress and
egress through airspace. The free use of outer space could be effectively prevented if standards of reasonable use of the airspace on the
part of space vehicles-including both rocket propelled and X-15 and
X-20 prototypes-are established "--hich depart from the standards
applied to such vehicles while they are situated in outer space. It is
probable that in the future such vehicles, \vhen returning to earth,
will transit for long distances through areas which have been considered as airspace and, as such, subject to the full sovereignty of the
subjacent state.
Relatively little attention has been given to the express solution
o£ this essentially legal problen1. As has been pointed out previously,
no nation has yet protested the orbiting of spacecraft. This has been
interpreted to mean that such tacit consent has resulted in the existence of a rule of customary international law on this particular
subject. 20 The problem of transit through atmospheric areas has been
19 President Kennedy in his press conference of October 9, 1963. stated that
no formal agreement existed between the United States and the Soviet Union
to ban nuclear weapons from outer space. He said: "The United States bas
stated it would not put weapons in outer space. The Soviet Union has stated
that it does not intend to do so. Some day they may decide to do so, so we
obviously have to take our own precautions. But we don't intend to, though
'Ye intend to protect our security. We are glad to hear the Soviet Union does
not intend to. This is a matter, it seems to me, that can best be handled not
through any bilateral agreement but as a General Assembly matter, because
other countries may some day have the same· capability, and I think every
country should declare that they are not going to put atomic weapons in the
atmosphere which could threaten not only the security of a potential adversary
but our own security, if for some reason the weapon should miscalculate and
descend on us. I think it is a good idea to keep them out of the atmosphere."
New York Times, October 10, 1963. For U.N. Resolution 1884 (XVIII), October
17, 1963, see supra, p. 264. See generally, infra, p. 462.
2 0 The analogy from the law of the sea of innocent passage has been
noted by Goedhuis. He bas stated that "if the principle that outer space
is to be considered as 'res communis omnhun' is accepted, then as a neces·
~ary corollary, freedom of innocent passage (innoeent in the sense of it
not being prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the underlying
State) through the spare which is not considered to be outer space, should be
recognized." "The Question of Freedom of Innocent Passage of Space Yehicles
()f one State through the Space above the Territory of another State which is

273

commented on at the U.N. legal subco1nmittee by the :Wiexican delegate, "Tho, in referring to the launching of spacecraft and their subsequent transiting through the abnosphere, stated: "In that respect,
a conflict 'vith the old la ''""s seemed t"o have arisen, and the nonspace
Po\"Vers had accepted new standards in keeping with the general freedom. The implication of those ne\v standards should be considered
jn greater detail." 21
Substantial benefits are still to be realized through the free and
peaceful use and exploration of outer space and celestial bodies. ..t\.c-cordingly, it might be argued that all the uses of spacecraft ·which
.are no\v considered to be reasonable in outer space should also be
considered reasonable in airspace, at least at such time as spacecraft
are engaged in normal launch and return. In order for spacecraft
to depart from and return to the earth \vithout disrupting typical
-operational activities in the airspace and on the surface, it \Yill be
necessary to arrive at express and detailed international agreen1ents.
Ho·wever, it is submitted that the legal principles per1nitting reasonable egress from national territory and return thereto by the sa1ne
spacecraft for peaceful purposes have been clearly formulated.' 22 Ad-ditionally, there is need for an express international agreement fixing
the upper lin1its or zones of the atmosphere in which the subjacent
state exercises its not unlimited sovereignty. Further, with respect
to spacecraft, pending the express for1nalization of a rule of innocent
passage through the airspace of another nation, a stnte may \Vaive
its soYereignty in order that space vehicles n1ay be used for reason.able and peaceful purposes. However, the need for such an express
international agreement on innocent passage does not invalidate the
·existing principle of space la '' which per1nits space vehicles, of the
not Outer Space," Second Golloquiutn 43. Compare, ~IcDougal, Lasswell and
Vlasic, supra note 13, at 197-8, 320-359; and Haley, Space Law and Governm ent 69-70 (1963). On the other hand, l\Iachowski, a Polish writer on air and
:svace law, considers the matter to be somewhat academic. He nonetheless
-calls specific attention to national sovereignty over superjacent airspace.
"Certain Aspects of the Right of Innocent Passage of Space Vehicles," Fourth
Colloquiutn 59. Compare Horsford, "Spy Satellites and The Law," 2 International A.fjairs 310 (1962) who has stated: "It seems that a right of innocent
va~sage will ha ,.e to be provided through the airspace of adjoining states for
<>utward and returning spacecraft, as there would otherwise be an infringe1nent of sovereignty of these states." See also 'Yilliams, "The Law of The
Sea: A Parallel for Space Law," Department of the Army, Pam 27-100-22,
.Jl ilitary Law Review 168 (October 19G3).
n U.N. Doc. A/ AC.l03/C.2/SR.l8, 7.
22
Intra., pp. 200-253.
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type currently in use, to operate peacefully in those areas they have
been using since 1957. ' '7ithin the context o£ present space practice~
and activities, this principle has already been established. In short,
an express agree1nent is required to regulate the details of reasonable
and peaceful operational activities of spacecraft. at low altitudes.
Reasonableness of use 1nay be examined under two basic questions.
First, is conduct so inherently destructive of the preferred values of
1nankind that it cannot be tolerated? Second, is conduct to be deen1ed
unreasonable because of a failure on the part of the resource state
to confor1n to agreed standards 'vhich have been designed to modify,
and perhaps ameliorate, legiti1nate national concerns for international peace and security and self-defense?
In view of the hybrid uses of whi~h space vehicles are capable,
it is not possible to state categorically that there is co1nplete agreeInent as to the characteristics of a reasonable use. It is for this reason
that the 1najor resource nations are in disagree1nent as to certain
uses. The United States has taken the position that the use of observational satellites is a peaceful, and therefore a reasonable one. The
Soviet Union, on the other hand, has contended-with the support of
me1nbers of the Soviet Bloc-that observation by satellite of subjacent surface areas within the Soviet Union constitutes a :forn1 of
"espionage." This contention has been based on the groundless assertion that such "espionage" is violative of international law. The
legality of engaging in observation fron1 space will be discussed
belO\V.":! 3
The United States has also taken the position that the use of con1Inunications satellites is a peaceful, and therefore a reasonable one.
The Soviet Union has contended-again \Yith the support of men1bers
of the Soviet Bloc-that the disse1nination of certain ideas which
have been described as using outer space for "propagating war,
national or racial hatred or enmity between nations is inadnlissible." 24 This contention has generally been urged under the heading
of "'var propaganda." Soviet concern has been based on the belief
23

24

Infra, pp. 277-295.
U.N. Doc. A/AC.lO:i/12, Annex 1, 2. This is Paragraph 5 of the Soviet

Declaration of the Basic Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space. ln.fra, pp. 466-468. See pp. 295-300 infra,
for a discussion of this contention.
:\Ir. Fedorenko in a statement of the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space in September 1963 urged the impermissibility of the use of satellites
"for war propaganda and for provaganda connected with national and racial
hatred and enmity among peoples.~' U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV 20, 46. See also
General Assembly Resolution 1962 (XVIII), infra, p. 450.
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that communications satellites will reach a state of perfection
'vhereby there may be direct foreign broadcasts to receivers located
'vithin the Soviet Union. In view of the well known Soviet policy
of n1aintaining a closed society, the prospect of having both radio and
television broadcasts 'vithin the uncontrolled grasp of the Soviet
population has probably been the cause for this position. The .Soviet
passion for secrecy and their concern for inspection of space and military facilities has undoubtedly led to the allegation of "espionage."
'Vith respect both to "war propaganda" and to the "collection of intelligence information," the Soviet contentions are merely serious
proposals or claims. Their views cannot be considered to be either
international law or based on international law.
There is, however, a limited agreement between the t'vo major resource nations that some observational and communications activities
carried on in outer space are reasonable. There is also full agreen1ent
that meteorological activities are reasonable. As to observational
activities, the Dryden-Blagonravov Summary of Understandings of
June 8, 1962, called for a world geomagnetic survey, including a joint
effort to coordinate the launching of two artificial earth satellites
equipped with magnetometers. The representatives of the two countries
Recognized that data obtained in earth magnetic observatories
"~ere of particularly great importance for the successful coinpilation of a map of the magnetic field of the earth 'vitli the aid of
artificial earth satellites. 25
Operational programs have been established to engage in these scientific observations and assurances have been given for the exchange of
independently acquired data.
In· regard to con1munications activities, the same Understanding
Inade provision for cooperation in 1962 and 1963 "in experiments on
co1nmunication by means of the U.S. satellite 'Echo . A.-12'." 26 Further, the Understanding announced an intention to "give further
consideration to the possibilities of cooperation in joint experiments
using active satellites that may be launched by either nation in the
future, including the mutual exchange of information on the results
of such experi1nents, and to resume discussions of these possibilities
at * * *" a subsequent series of meetings. 27
On the subject of meteorology, the Understanding called for the. exchange of such "data gathered by each nation fron1 its O\Vll experiU.N. Doc. A/0.1/880, 5. Annex 22, infra, pp. 482-488.
Ibid., 5.
27 Ibid.
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mental 1neteorological satellites * * * 'vith the understanding that
such transfers will include selected cloud-cover pictures, especially
related to stor1ns, votices, fronts and the generation of these phenon1ena, "~ith g~ographical coordin~tes provided for all pictures selected, together with nephanalyses based upon the data as a "?hole
* * * . The same communication links "~ould be used to exchange
"~eather charts, diagra1ns, vertical cross-sections, and the n1aterial required for solving the problen1s of world weather, including the extension of prediction periods." 28 In 1964-1965, during the second
stage of the joint 1neteorological satellite progra1n, the Understanding calls for the coordination of launchings by the two nations
of a systen1 of operational weather satellites. Such a program necessitates the deterinination of mutually agreeable launching "schedules
for the operational satellites, the nu1nbers of such satellites, their
orbits, and the comparability (to the degree desirable) of the characteristics of their sensors and the data to be obtained." 29
The Understanding, by its delineation of specific areas of use, has
provided a basis upon ''hich to project other uses. 1"hus, if the
agreed uses may be considered to be reasonable-and no nation or
person has denied that the afore1nentioned uses are reasonable uses
of outer space-it 1nay be stated that comparable or parallel uses
1nay also be reasonable. This is true even though some of the uses
may be hybrid. But the fact of hybridity is not important. The inlportant consideration is that certain uses-even if capable of being
variously en1ployed in differing situations-have been and are being
applied for the benefit of men and nations. However, even without
the consensus contained in the Understanding, it is quite clear · that
those which are both peaceful and beneficial to men and nations n1ay
be considered to be reasonable. The Understanding is merely illustrative of specific reasonable uses.
~fany other uses of outer space and celestial bodies by means of
space vehicles also fall within the category of reasonable uses. These
include, but are not limited to, the follo,ving: the gathering of geodetic and navigational information·, the gathering of scientific and
technological infor1nation, the gathering of general information
affecting space research, the gathering of· infor1nation relating to
weather forecasting and control, the gathering of information facilitating practical com1nunications services and activities, the gathering
of information related to general scientific and technological research,
and the gathering of information facilitatipg security a~1d defensive
goals even though of a military nature. Additional reasonable uses
28

29

Ibid.
Ibid., 3-4.
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may be said to include: the e1nployn1ent of space vehicles in ways
conducive to obtaining experience in operating such vehicles, general
exploration and experin1entation, facilitation of resource exploitation,
development of kno,v-ho'v in the field of transportation, and for the
ascertain1nent of means and processes whereby protection against disease and forn1s of contamination n1ay be achieved. In addition, outer
space may be used in 'vays reasonably designed to further n1an 's
useful social and political activities both on earth and in outer space
and on celestial bodies. l\Ian 1nay also engage . in such additional
activities required to facilitate any or all of the foregoing, including
such incidental activities as the recovery of space personnel, vehicles)
and equipment. Such reasonable activities have their situs both on
the earth, in the atmosphere, and in outer space. As man continues
to gain experience in the peaceful use and exploration of outer space
and celestial bodies, 1nany uses, in addition to these mentioned, will
qualify as reasonable uses. 30

C. THE SPECIAL SOVIET VIEW OF OBSERVATIONAL
ACTIVITIES
The Soviet social system has produced a national "obsession for
secrecy * * *" 31 which has conditioned not only the Soviet policy to'vard disarn1an1ent and arn1s control, but,has also materially affected
their views of the legality of space vehicles equipped to scan both
earth and the vast inter-stellar reaches of outer space. Secretary of
State Rusk has described the Soviet habit of referring to observation
-inspection in a disar1nan1ent context-as "espionage." He stated in

1962:
I would not try to say whether this is a deep-seated, traditional
passion for secrecy on the Russian scene or a consequence of the
30 Compare, Bloomfield, ed., Outer Space Prospects tor ~Ian and Society
(1962) ; Hogan, "A Guide to the Study of Space Law," 5 St. Louis UniversUy
Law Journal 79-133 (19G8) ; Lipson and Katzenbach, The Law of Outer Space:
Report to the National Aeronautics and Space Adtni.njstration (1960) ; Odishaw,
ed., The Challenges of Space (1962) ; Ramo, ed., Peacetime Uses of Outer Space
(1961) ; Goodwin, Space: Frontier Unlimited 60-83 (1962) ; Goldsen, "Some
Social Implications of the Space Program," 6 American Behavorial Scientist
5 (l\farch 1963). First, Second, Third, Fourth Golloqui1n on the Law of Outer
Space 1959-1962; and Legal Problems of Space Exploration, A Sympositnn
(1961). No protest has been recorded respecting the uses reported to the
United Nations in connection with the launches engaged in by the U.S.A. and
the U.S.S.R. These uses are recorded in U.N. Docs. A/AC.105/Inf.
31 Rusk, "United States Again Calls for Action on Drafting of Disarmament
Treaty," 47 Department of State Bulletin 245 (1962) ; Rusk, "Basic Issues Underlying the Present Crisis," 47 Department of State Bulletin 870 (1962).
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belief that secrecy is an i1nportant military asset. It is probably
a combination of these and many other factors.
But whatever the reasons behind this alleged preoccupation
''ith espionage, three things seem to me to be clear.
One is that the major powers know all that they need to know
about each other to inflict devastating damage in the event of
''ar. Espionage in its classical sense is no longer relevant to this
great overriding issue. 32
Even though in a practical sense the two n1ajor resource nations
1nay know enough about each other's military and defense posture to
inflict great damage in the event of war, and even though espionage
in its classical sense may not be relevant to the space age, it is nonetheless true that the Soviets have asserted that United States observational satellites have been engaged in "espionage" of the Soviet
Union from outer space. By injecting this issue into the legal discussions carried on in the co1nmittees of the United Nations, the Soviets
have contributed to the difficulty of arriving at express agree1nents
on space law principles and rules.
The Soviet attitude to,,ard "espionage" fron1 superjacent areas has
been influenced by certain acts of observation or reconnaissance which
have taken place in Soviet airspace. Soviet authors, in discussing the
problem of sovereignty over the airspace, wrote in 1956, "At the
beginning of 1956, large balloons fitted with special apparatt1s for
reconnaissance by aerial photography and launched by U.S. Inilitary
bodies, began to penetrate into the airspace of the people's Denlocracies and the U.S.S.R." 33 In 1960, the Soviets beca1ne aware of
reconnaissance carried out via overflights of the U -2 type aircraft,
and from over the high seas-as in the case of the RB-47-and in
both instances complained of the "real or ttlleged 'violation' of its
'frontiers' or airspace by American aircraft." 34
The observational capabilities of aircraft and spacecraft 'vhen
directly over a state or when adjacent thereto are unquestionably
extensive. At the present ti1ne, the observational capabilities of space
vehicles are so extensive and their observational techniques are so
versatile that they can be very efficient, even though at the time their
observational activity is conducted they need not be either over a state
32

Ibid.

Kislov and Krylov, "State Sovereignty in Airspace," International Affairs
(:Moscow) 34 (l\Iarch 1956) ; Legal Problems of Space Exploration, A Sym1JOsizun 1037.
3t Lissitzyn, "Some Legal Implications of the U-2 and RB-47 Incidents,"
GG A.J.l.L. 136 (1962). See, 'Yright, '"Legal Aspects of the U-2 Incident," 54
A ..J.I.L. 836 (1960).
33
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or its territorial waters. In fact, the vehicle may be a long distance
both horizontally and laterally from the observed area. Mere "overness" or physical proximity does not impede successful observational
results.
These facts bring into focus both the extent of national sovereignty
a:nd the e.xtent of national control over superjacent areas, e.g., the
airspace and outer space. Lissitzyn and Crane have examined the
views of Soviet lawyers, and have independently arrived at the view
that the Soviets recognize upper limits to national sovereignty. Thus,
Lissitzyn has 'vritten that "Since the launching of Sputnik I in
October, 1957, Soviet writers have been virtually unanimous in expressing the vie'v that state sovereignty has or should have an up'vard limit and should not extend infinitely into space, but have not
suggested any specific boundary between airspace 'vhich is under national sovereignty and outer space 'vhich is not." 35 The force of
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI) has also been to prevent sovereignty from applying in outer space. However, the freedom of peaceful use and exploration of outer space need not be
unlimited. Thus, the Soviet contention that orbiting observational
satellites in outer space constitutes a form of "espionage" has served
as a means to ascertain that if this assertion is accepted, one form
of control over the free and peaceful uses of outer space is created.
In short, the problem is to determine whether a specific type of observation by satellite is unreasonable, illegal, and subject to some
form of either national or international control.
It should be noted that the Soviet proposed draft declaration of
basic principles, which constitutes their official claim regarding "espionage," provides that "9. The use of artificial satellites for the
c_ollection of intelligence information in the territory of a foreign
Sta~e is incompatible with the objectives of mankind in its conquest
of outer space." 36 Interpreted literally, intelligence information
Li~sitzyn, supra note . 34, at 137. Crane "Communist Viewpoints," Lcga~
Problems of Space Explorati?n, A Symposium 1012-1014.
36 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/12, · Annex 1, 2. The Soviets have displayed no willingness to depart from this viet"v·point. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.20, 46 ( Septem35

ber 1963). The same position has been advanced in the Soviet Draft International Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts and Spaceships l\Iaking
Emergency Landings. Thus, in the second paragraph of Article 7 it bas lJeen
proposed that ''Space vehicles aboard which devices have been discovered for
the collection of int~lligence information .in the territory of another State shall
not be returned." U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/12, Annex 1, 4. This would create an
exception to the prescribed duty to return, pro ..dded other conditions b~d lJeen
met.
791-405---'66--19
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would not seen1 to include a great deal of the observational activity
carried on by artificial satellites, and, by 'vay of random example,
could hardly be construed to deal with such meteorological information gathering as relates to cloud cover, the amount of energy received on earth and in space directly from the sun, the amounts of
energy reflected by clouds, ice, snow, and other bright objects, and
the amount of energy radiated by earth. 37 Nor could it be thought
to inhibit the gathering of navigational and geodetic inforn1ation.
The list of items of information which it is, and would be, reasonable
for satellites to collect might be extended indefinitely.
The Soviet view that the collection of intelligence information in
the territory of a state should be considered to be "espionage" is
based on the concept of security. The Soviet effort to arrive at specific
instances of control over the free use of outer space for peaceful
purposes has been clearly demonstrated by Zhukov. He has stated
that "each state has a right to use outer space at its own discretion,
but without causing harm or damage to other states." 38 It 'vas his
further view that the United States has a national policy and plans
to engage in "space espionage directed against the security of the
U.S.S.R.. and the other Socialist countries [and this policy and plans
are] incompatible with the generally recognized principles and rules
of international law, designed to protect the security of states against
encroachments from outside including outer space. In the past, considerations of state security have been of decisive importance in
determining the airspace regime. Today the same considerations
must m1derline the regin1e of outer space." 39
The Soviets have identified the ~Iidas, Sa1nos, and Tiros type satellites as those, among others, that were intended to reconnoiter their
rocket and missile bases. 40 Some Soviet writers have contended that
37 These were mentioned by Dr. Richard W. Porter, Chairman, USNC Technical Panel on the IG Y, in his testimony in 1958 to a subcommittee of the
House Committee on Appropriations. The peaceful and scientific nature of
such information gathering seems obYious. Review of the First Eleven 1lfonths
of the Int ernational Geophysical Year, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 146 (1958).
38 Zbukov, "Space Espionage Plans and International Law," International
Affa irs (l\Ioscow) G3-57 (October 1960) ; Legal Problems of Space Exploration, A Symposizon 1099.
3 9 Ibid., 1008-1099. Korovin bas asserted that espionage in peacetime "is an
act of political aggression." "Peaceful Co-operation in Space," 1962 International Affairs (l\Ioscow) 61 (:~larch 1962) ; Compare, ZhukoY, "Practical Problems of Space Law," Internatio-nal Affairs (l\Ioscow) 26 (:l\Iay 1963).
4 0 Kucberov, "Soviet Attitude To,vard International Law and Outer Space,"
Chapter VI of Soviet Space Programs: Organization Plans, Goals, and International ImpUcations, U.S. Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences 208 (1962). Crane, supra note 35, at 1014-1015.
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satellite "espionage" was being conducted by the United States in
order to facilitate an aggressive, and presumably, surprise attack
against the Soviet Union. Thus, the charge has been made that "The
United States and other imperialist Powers want to militarize outer
space, seeking to turn it into a new theatre of hostilities." 41
Traditional international law has never considered "espionage" to
be unlawful. It has, in fact, endeavored to regularize the treatment
of captured spies. It is true, however, that espionage as defined in
the laws of states constitutes a crime under much municipal legislation. Such laws have taken into account the individual's location
when engaged in espionage activities as well as the type of activity
in which the individual is engaged. At this time these laws regard
espionage as an intentional and prohibited act of an individual.
Whether information gathering by a machine, particularly an unmanned machine, constitutes a criine pursuant to most municipal
laws as presently written, is doubtful. On the other hand, Goedhuis
has taken the view that the invasion of a state's territorial airspace
by an information gathering satellite could properly result in summary action. He has suggested that if the space vehicle of one state,
while in orbit, were to pass through the airspace of another stateand this, of course, assumes that there is agreement as to the boundary between airspace and outer space-"it is clear that a State has a
right to take affirn1ative measures against these satellites for an
infringement of its sovereignty as well as for a breach of municipal
law concerning espionage." 42 This view, perhaps, assumes too much.
First, if the space vehicle's function is a peaceful one-and it has
never been thought that during a nonwarlike situation an information-gathering function of a maritime vessel beyond the territorial
seas was other than a peaceful one-then a subjacent state would not
be permitted to extend its municipal la'v to such a function when
the space vehicle was in outer space above the nation's territory.
Second, while it is clear that sovereignty does not determine the
areas in which a state may exercise defensive rights, Goedhuis' vie'v
assumes that the information gathering function of the spacecraft is
unreasonable in that it is likely to cause serious harm to the national
well-being of the subjacent state. Another reason for his vie'v may
be that at the present time there does not appear to be any effective
way to determine whether the function of the transiting satellite is
"Forum: Space Exploration and International Relations," International
Affairs (Moscow) 57-63 (June 1961) ; Soviet Space Programs, op. cit., 306.
41

42 Goedhuis, "Some Trends in the Political and Legal Thinking on the Conquest of Space," 9 Netherland International Law Review 124 (1962).
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dangerous or not to the security of the subjacent state. Third, if it
i_s true that the function of the satellite 'vhile in outer space is a
peaceful one, the activity by the satellite in the airspace of the subjacent state while temporarily transiting in the process of launch or
landing must also be considered to be peaceful. Finally, Goedhuis
assumes that n1unicipalla,vs have clearly defined information gathering, by an un1nanned space vehicle while in the airspace, to be municipal espionage. This may be if the statute so provides. Internationalla,v, however, is not the product of the policy of a single state,
and the fact that the Soviet expressions concerning "espionage" in
space do not constitute international la'v has been noted by one distinguished Soviet international lawyer. l(oretsky, at the 49th session
of the International La'v Association, charged that the use of information gathering satellites was violative of the Charter of the
United Nations, but that the use of the Discoverer type satellite 'vas
"taking advantage of the lack of regulations covering what satellites may or may not do in orbit." 43
In international law, espionage in the traditional sense consists of
wartime conduct. Wartime espionage is governed by Articles 29-31 of
the Regulations of The Hague 1907 Convention IV. 44 Article 29
defines a spy as a person who engages in spying, 'vho acts clandestinely or on false pretenses, who obtains or endeavors to obtain information, and 'vho performs the prohibited conduct in the zone of
operations of a belligerent with the intention of communicating it to
the hostile party. The 1907 Regulations place emphasis on the fact
that such conduct is individual conduct, and provide, :for exa1nple, in
Article 30, that a spy shall not be punished without trial.
A recent analysis of the law of espionage states "The act of spying is not in violation of international law. Punishment of captured
spies is permitted as an act of self-protection, the law equally permitting the one to send spies, the other to punish them if captured." 45
Spying in peacetime has not been defined by treaty. A recent
United States Army publication states with regard to the conduct
of espionage under such condition that it "is not considered wrong
morally, politically, or legally * * *" 46 In such circumstances captured spies are punished under appropriate national laws because
"The sole norm in peacetime is the municipal law of each state in the
Ibid., note 17. The quoted words are those of Goedhuis.
36 Stat. 2277.
45 II Department of the Army Pam 27-161-2, International Law 58 (1962).
Compare, II Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, International Lato 422 (7th ed. 1952) ;
Fl\I 27-10, Law of Land Warfare par 77 (1956).
6
• Ibid., 61. Compare, I
Lauterpacht-Oppenheiln, International Law 859, 862
(8th ed. 1955) .
43
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absence of a commonly agreed international rule similar to the IV
Hague Convention. If the act alleged violates the municipal law of
the country in question, that is sufficient for the trial to proceed." 47
The effort by the Soviet Union at" the United Nations to make intelligence gathering in a nation by satellite a violation of international law seeks to modify existing internationalla,v. In this instance
the Soviet Union appears to be following the precept that information gathering by satellites is permitted until it is prohibited. But,
by their protests they have given the impression that such information gathering is not an acceptable peaceful, and hence reasonable,
use of outer space. Much of their difficulty has arisen from their
refusal to recognize that United States observational activities, as
well as their o'vn, are exceedingly varied. Furthermore, they have
not been willing to admit that the purpose of the United States in
gathering Soviet military information has been to obtain facts of
prospective Soviet military activity so that defensive planning may
be undertaken rather than, as the Soviets have perhaps believed, for
. .
.
engaging In aggressive uses.
In view of the importance of the problem, a short resume of Soviet
efforts to put intelligence gathering activities into the category of
unreasonable and even nonpeaceful uses will be attempted. Their
efforts to employ the language of "espionage" in order to achieve
guarantees against "an invasion of privacy" will have substantial
impact upon the future of international cooperation in outer space.
As previously pointed out, there is a general consensus that spacecraft ought to be returned to the launching state when it comes down
in the territory of another or on the high seas. This vie'v was challenged by the Soviet delegate to the First Committee in December
1962, 'vhen he suggested that an exception "would be Inade in the
case of a vehicle aboard which devices have been found for the collection of intelligence data from the territory of another States
(sic)." 48 It 'vas argued that such an exception should be based on
the view that such gathering of information was inco1npatible with
the Charter and involved the "violation of the sovereignty of another
State. It is indubitable that espionage is such a violation, even if
it is effected from space." 49
J1Jid., note 88. at 61. The espionage statute of the United States is 18
l!.S.C., 793 and 794. It applies to both wartime and peacetime situations, seems
to apply only to individuals, and makes illegal the obtaining of inforn1ation and
the passing of it on to a foreign power. The place in which or from which
the information is obtained is not limited in the statute.
48
U.N. Doc. A/C.l/PV.1289, 56. See Annex 2, infra, pp. 443-446.
4 9 Ibid.
47
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The division betw·een the United States and the Soviet Union on
this point n1ay best be reflected by quoting from Senator Gore's
speech to the Com1nittee and the reply of ~1r. ~Iorozov. Senator Gore
stated that one of the consequences of the hybrid capabilities of space
vehicles was that:
Any nation may use space satellites for such purposes as observation and information-gathering. Observation from space is
consistent with internationalla,v, just as is observation from the
high seas. ~1oreover, it serves many useful purposes. Observation satellites can measure solar and stellar radiation and observe
the atmosphere and surfaces of other planets. They can observe
cloud formations and weather conditions. They can observe the
earth and add to the science of geodesy. Observation satellites
obviously have military as well as scientific applications. But
this can provide no basis for objection to observation satellites.
''Tith malice toward none, science has decreed that we are to
live in an increasingly open 'vorld, like it or not, and openness,
in the view of my Government, can only serve the cause of peace.
The United States, like every other nation represented here in
this Committee, is determined to pursue every non-aggressive
step which it considers necessary to protect its national security
and the security of its friends and allies, until that day arrives
when such precautions are no longer necessary. 5°
l\1r. ~Iorozov introduced his remarks by stating that the foregoing
constituted an attempt at theoretical justification of illegal observation and infor1nation gathering ac.tivities. He said:
'Ve cannot agree 'vith the claim that all observation from
space, including observation for the purpose of collecting intelligence data, is in conformity with international la,Y-a conclusion which could be dra·w·n from the statement made this morning by the representative of the United States. Such observation
is just as wTong as when intelligence data are obtained by other
means, such as by photographs made from the air. The object to
which such illegal surveillance is directed constitutes a secret
guarded by a sovereign State, and regardless of the 1neans by
which such an operation is carried out, it is in all cases an intrusion into something guarded by a sovereign State in conformity w·ith its sovereign prerogative. Thus such observations are in
violation of the sovereignty of States, and no analogy exists
here 'vith principles applying to the open seas. If it 'vere merely
5o

Ibid., 13-15.
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a case of observing what happens on the high seas, one could of
course accept this analogy; but when it is a case of observation
on the high seas for purposes of collecting intelligence information, then 've are dealing with an intrusion into the sovereign
rights of States, an atte1npt to penetrate into that 'vhich a State
tries to protect on its territory. And I should add to this the
further fact that, for technical reasons, one cannot find out by
observation on the high seas what one can find out :from outer
space.
Thus this analogy used by the representative of the United
States can be considered neither from the factual nor from the
legal angle as valid and applying to the situation we are at present discussing. For these reasons we consider that the activities
involved are incompatible 'vith the provisions of the United N ations Charter. Such gathering of intelligence data through the
use of space vehicles is in violation of the sovereign rights of
States, and if outer space is to be used in peaceful cooperation,
such operations cannot be regarded as legal or in confor1nity
with international law, and hence there could be no question of
the possibility of defending such a position on the basis of international law and generally recognized principles. 51
The Soviet representative did not provide any information concerning the content of "intelligence data," and the subsequent discussions
have not achieved specificity as to such content. However, the subject has received no little attention in the legal subcommittee of the
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, April-~fay 1963,
and again during September 1963. 52
The Soviet Union, as the proponent of the view that the gathering
of intelligence data in a state by means of a transiting satellite is
"espionage" and therefore violative of international law, has assu1ned
the affirmative duty of proving these claims to be both valid and
acceptable. In seeking to prove its point it has raised the following
arguments. As noted above, it has been asserted that it is "Trong to
engage in the gathering of intelligence since it is allegedly an invasion of sovereignty, of the UN Charter, international law, and the
concept of peaceful cooperation. It is the Soviet view that since it
is wrong to gather information by 'vay of aerial photographs made
by superjacent aircraft, it is equally 'vrong to do so from outer space.
51

Ibid., 57. The Soviet argument that the use by the United States of in·
formation gathering satellites is illegal has been summarized by Crane in
"Soviet Attitude Toward International Space Law," 56 A.J.I.L. 704-706 (1962).
5 2 U.N. Docs. A/ AC.105/PV.20, 21, 22, 23.
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.A.ccordingly, neither the altitudes nor the 1neans employed may be
considered as significant distinguishing differences.
X onetheless, the Soviets do not adn1it that they are limited in their
intelligence gathering activities conducted on the high seas or from
outer space. The absence of national sovereignty over the high seas
is given as their reason for the la,vfulness of such conduct. Such
reasoning prestunably ·would also apply to intelligence gathering
from the airspace above the high seas and outer space above the
same air-sea space environn1ent concerning events in such areas. But
in the April-l\iay 1963, U.N. debates, the Soviet delegate rejected,
as lacking in factual and legal validity, an analogy bet,veen intelligence gathering activities 'vithin a nation from the high seas and
the same activities conducted from outer space. Apparently he dre'v
some significance froin the fact that observational equipment, technically capable of obtaining information on or from the high seas,
need not serve effectively 'vhen used in outer space, and also that the
latter dimension was a more favorable observation position.
The Soviet delegate told the legal subcommittee on April 17, 1963,
that the altitude from which "espionage" occurred-apparently the
same meaning has been attached by the Soviets to this term as that
of collecting intelligence information-did not serve to distinguish
such activities from comparable ones engaged in at lower altitudes.
He again asserted that 'vhen such activity was conducted in the territory of a sovereign state, it was incompatible with the objectives of
mankind in the conquest of outer space and with the theory and
practice of international law. He again argued that since such conduct had been prohibited by national la,vs, the same principle
"should" apply to espionage in outer space. 53 He also urged that the
1907 Hague and the 1944 Chicago Conventions had relevancy, and
said that "Provisions of the Hague Convention of 1907 respecting
the Laws and Customs of \"Var on Land outlawed spying, and satellites used for the collection of intelligence Inaterial "~ould be spies .
. t\.rticle
.
36 of the Convention on International Civil 1\. viation signed
at Chicago in 1944 stated 'Each contracting State may prohibit or
regulate the use of photographic apparatus in aircraft over its territory'." 54 The Chicago Convention, however, has no applicability
to spacecraft in space.
53
54

U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.17, 7.
Ibid. Haley appears to be in error when be concludes that it is "accepted

international law" that "no man-made object or vehicle may pass over it
["every sovereign nation"] at any height if such passage is for the purpose of
acquiring military intelligence." Haley, supra note 21, at 91. Compare, l\fcDougal, Lasswell and Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space 491-496 (1963).
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In contending that the substance of municipal la 'v provisions dealing with espionage "should" be applied to conduct in outer space,
the Soviet representative, by implication, adn1itted that the rule had
not been incorporated into international la,v. In asserting that "espionage" in outer space was incompatible with the practice of international law, one may perhaps conclude that the Soviet representative was acknowledging that as of that time no such conduct had
been engaged in, although, as noted above, many private Soviet
writers have contended that certain types of United States satellites
were engaged in "unlawful" information gathering activities. Finally, the claim by the Soviets concerning the applicability o£ the
1944 Chicago Convention was made in the face of the fact that the
Soviets have never become a party to that agreement. Furthern1ore,
they have never stated that they were not engaged in infor1nation
gathering activities in other countries. In fact Premier Khrushchev
acknowledged in l\1ay 1964, that Soviet satellites had photographed
military installations at high altitudes.
On April 26, 1963, the Soviet delegate again made reference to
the problem of intelligence gathering by means of satellite. On this
occasion, emphasis was placed on the contention that such conduct
'vas contrary to the interest of friendly international relations and
the immateriality of the altitude :from 'vhich such observation took
place was again asserted. Additionally, the analogy o:f freedom of
observation on the high seas was again rejected, and the Soviet delegate pointed out that there were in fact numerous limitations upon
the independence of national ships, namely, nations had established
"either temporarily or permanently-warning, danger, restricted or
prohibited areas for numerous purposes." 55
It 'vas the Soviet view that the acceptance of a rule respecting the
gathering of intelligence information in a state was "simply a confirmation and extension of an accepted principle of international
law." 56 The unwillingness of other states, it was charged, to accept
such a rule 'vas "evidence of a desire * * * to reserve the possibility
of using outer space for espionage purposes." 57
~t\.s has been noted, the Soviet draft agreen1ent on emergency landings also suggested that the collection of intelligence information in
the territory of a foreign state was wrong and in conflict 'vith the
objectives of mankind in the conquest of outer space. 58 In comment55

U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.22, 5.
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Ibid.
Ibid.
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ing on this proposal, the Soviet delegate told the subcommittee on
April 30, 1963, that "it could not be seriously supposed that a State
finding a spy satellite with equipment containing photographs of
strategic objects on its territory ''ould return that satellite untouched
to the launching State, since the return of the satellite 'vould adversely affect the security of the State in " . hich it had landed." 59
Before the subcommittee concluded its April-~fay 1963, session,.
the delegates endeavored to summarize the achievements of the Ineetings. The Soviet delegate protested that the United States had
declined even to discuss the Soviet contention dealing with the
gathering of intelligence in a state by use of an artificial satellite. It
was ackno".,.ledged, however, that there had been numerous protests
against the Soviet proposals, and notice was served by the Soviets
that they had not given up their support of the wholly novel view of
this phase of international la\v. It 'vas stated that "All atten1pts to
reconcile the collection of intelligence information by artificial satellites with the principles of international law 'Yere completely unfounded. Espionage in any environment 'vas inadmissible and it
was prohibited by every system of national law." 60 However, by
September 1963, the Soviet Union's delegate to the Con1mittee on
The Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was content in a long speech
merely to say that his country attached "considerable importance to
efforts finally to achieve agreement on the question of the impermissibility of the use of satellites for collecting intelligence information." 61 It should also be noted that General Assembly Resolution
1962 (XVIII) fails to take any a~ount o:f the Soviet point of view.
The Soviet position did receive limited support in the April-l\fay
1963, deliberations of the subco1nmittee. Thus; some of the states
composing the Communist bloc, such as Romania, 62 Hungary, 63 Bulgaria,64 and Albania., 65 considered the Soviet proposals to be either
humanitarian or based on sovereign rights and designed to eliminate
conditions ini1nical to the cause of peace. All, as did the Soviet
Union, argued that such proposals sho1.tld be incorporated into the
69

U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.25, 14.
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.28, 13.
61
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.20, 46.
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U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.18, 10.
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U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.21, 4. "Espionage, which was contrary to the
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M U.N. Doc. A/ AC.105/C.2/SR.23, 8.
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body of internationalla"\V, and that this might be accomplished by the
acceptance of the Soviet drafts. None, ho,vever, made any effort to
offer any detail as to the meaning of "intelligence information."
During the April-J\:fay 1963, meetings of the subcommittee, the
United States made no effort to debate the Soviet proposal. It preferred to engage in the actual practices follo"~ed from 1957 to the
present and the position of the United States is well kno,vn. In an
address delivered on April 13, 1963, l\fr. l\feeker, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State, made it clear that observation from space
to space, airspace, and to the earth was governed by the Charter of
the United Nations, by international law, and, in particular, by
Resolution 1721 (XVI) which commended to the countries of the
world the principle that outer space and celestial bodies are free for
lawful exploration and use. It "\vas his general proposition that
"observation of the earth from outer space is a legitimate and permissible activity in the peaceful exploration and use of space. Observation neither \\rorks nor threatens injury or damage to any persons or
things on earth." 66 He therefore concluded that "observation from
space comes within the freedom 'vhich the General Assembly has
recognized * * *"in Resolution 1721 A 1 (b) .67
After pointing to the hybrid uses of space vehicles, l\feeker noted
their importance in the promotion of international security. He
stated that:
Another important potential use of observation in space is the
possibility of acquiring information about military preparations,
and thus help in maintaining international peace and security.
One of the great problems in today's world is the uncertainty
generated by the secret development, testing, and deployment of
national armaments and by the lack of information on military
preparations within closed societies. If in fact a nation is not
preparing a surprise attack, observations from space could help
us to know this and thereby increase confidence in world security
which might otherwise be subject to added and unnecessary
doubts. 68
On this basis he arrived at an important conclusion, and related
it to the international la 'v of outer space. He stated:
The fact that observation satellites clearly have military as
well as scientific and com1nercial applications can provide no
66 M~eeker,

"Observation in Space," Department of State Press Release No.
191 (Revised), April 12, 1963, 2. Compare, Gardner, "Cooperation in Outer
Space," 41 Foreign Affairs 345, 347 (1963).
61 Ibid., 2.
68 Ibid., 5.
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basis for objection to observation satellites. International law
imposes no restrictions on observation from outside the limits of
national jurisdiction. Observation from outer space, like observation from the high seas or fro1n air space above the high seas,
is consistent with international law. 69
On ~fay 3, 1963, ~1r. ~1eeker summarized before the legal subcommittee the points on which a consensus had been achieved. Specifically, it had been understood that there existed "freedo1n of outer
space for exploration and use by all States, on a basis of equality in
accordance with international law; on the immunity of celestial
bodies from national appropriation; on the applicability of international law, including the United Nations Charter, to relations among
States in outer space; on retention by the ]aunching authority of
jurisdiction over the o'vnership of space vehicles; on assistance to
astronauts in distress and return of space vehicles and their personnel, and on liability for injury or damage caused by space vehicle
accidents." 70 It is noteworthy that no direct reference was made to
the Soviet proposals relating to the gathering of intelligence data.
The Soviet proposals have also been rejected by other states participating in the deliberations of the legal subcommittee. Thus, the
Italian delegate on April 22, 1963, held that the Soviet proposals fell
under the heading of "observation" rather than "that of espionage.
[It was his view that] Observation for peaceful and indeed deserving
purposes had heretofore been considered to be consistent with international law, as in the practice of observation from the high seas.
If the concept of freedom of the high seas was to be extended to
outer space, precedent 'vould not support the exclusion of such activity in outer space." 71 In the same context the Canadian delegate rejected the Soviet contention that the same national rights existed
v¥ith respect to observational conduct in outer space as are permitted
in the airspace by reason of Article 36 of the Chicago Convention. 7-2
He also supported the general analogy of the la 'v of the sea as applicable to outer space. Other delegates also noted and expressed
disagreement with the Soviet proposal. 73
69
70
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The Soviet position on the gathering of information from outer
space has demonstrated a unique inconsistency. There has been a
consistent attack on the propriety of United States information
gathering satellites while at the same time there has been Soviet support for the legality of their own space flights. 74 More important,
ho·wever, has been a nonofficial Soviet charge that such United States
space flights were unlawful as contrary to Resolution 1721 (XVI).
The United States has construed the resolution to mean that outer
space is free for peaceful use and exploration, and that all beneficial
uses other than activities constituting force or threats of force, i.e.,
aggression, against another state or states in violation of international law or the Charter of the United Nations, were legally permissible. As to this position one Soviet writer has alleged: "In contravention of the U.N. General Assembly's resolution of December
20, 1961, on the extension of international law to outer space, which
is to be used only for the benefit of mankind and in the interests of
states, the U.S.A. has stubbornly continued to launch its spies-in-thesky, secret satellites, military satellites and other satellites carrying
secret testing devices." 75 Thus, the Soviet position has been made
clear. It is their view that such observational techniques, like those
pursued by both unmanned balloons and manned aircraft superjacent
to and within close proximity to Soviet land areas, are inherently
illegal. However, while mere unauthorized entry by balloons and aircraft into airspace has been deemed to be a violation of the sovereignty of the subjacent state, 76 the Soviets have urged that all
intelligence gathering satellites were illegal-being engaged in "espionage"-and "\Vould therefore be considered by the Soviets as engaged in "aggressive conduct." 77
The Soviets have not made clear their reason for attaching special
importance to the collection of intelligence data by means of artificial
satellites, although their objection appears to be based on the wide
coverage afforded by satellites. Ho,vever, intelligence information
may be acquired by a number of other means, including radio signals,
74
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radar, and other processes when 1nounted on naval vessels, balloons,
rockets and aircraft. Thus, the principal objection to satellites seen1s
to be that they are highly efficient in acco1nplishing their n1ission,
rather than objection to their location or the fact that they n1ay be
1nanned or unn1anned. Their "aggressive" nature, according to the
Soviets, has been based principally upon their utility and not at all
upon any capability of engaging in overt or forceful conduct. The
charge of "espionage" has suggested that Soviet planning 'Yas unable
to accept, on the basis of n1utuality, the challenge of equal observational opportunity. 78
It w·ould appear that the Free orld for policy considerations is
obliged to reject the clai1n that intelligence gathering satellites are
engaged in aggressive conduct. To accept this contention 'vould constitute a capitulation to the principles and assu1nptions of a closed
society, and n1ight ulti1nately lead to other restrictions on the full
and free use of outer space for peaceful, i.e., nonaggressive and beneficial, purposes.
The Soviet claim that the collection of intelligence information in
the territory of a sovereign state constitutes "espionage" and that
such "espionage" violates the principles of international la'' has no
legal foundation. International la1v·, both customary and conventional, 1nakes no provision for espionage in time of peace. Articles
29-31 of the Regulations of the Fourth Hague Convention, 1D07, deal
'vith espionage in ti1ne of 'var. It is clear that the prohibited conduct under those circu1nstances is that of an individual who is entitled to a trial This "~ould seen1 to exclude un1nanned satellites. The
activity must be clandestine, bnt here the United States has given full
advance publicity to its 1nanned space activities, has 1nade reports to
the United Nations of its 1nanned and un1nannecl launches, and has
provided extensive official ne"~s releases so that the "~oriel public has
been made a'vare of such activities-so n1uch so that Soviet 'vriters
have been able to discuss these successes in great detail.
Espionage in wartime, if not carried out in a clandestine n1anner,
to result in punishment, must be undertaken pursuant to false pre-
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•s Deutsch, "A 'Vorld of 1\Ioderate Rivals," in Goldsen, ed., International
Political bnplicati.ons of Activities in Outer Space 181 (1960). He has suggested that under conditions of moderate riYalry, space powers may exercise
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acth·ities on the ground." 'Vhere the rivalry has gone beyond this condition
the opposing states may be induced to "try to shoot down" objectional satel·
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tenses. No record has been made of a satellite purporting to be
something else. The uniformed ''artime occupant, if any-like an
a via tor or any other military person- (assuming he were to be
charged 'vith spying) would be entitled to the protection of the
Regulations attached to the Fourth Hague Convention, 1907.
The fact that states have enacted municipal laws prohibiting conduct 'vhich has been defined unilaterally as espionage, even when the
defined conduct is engaged in beyond jurisdiction of the subject state,
need not establish international standards, and even less, international law. Surveillance at approximately 68,000 feet, as in the case
of the U-2, has been described by the Secretary of State of the
United States as "aerial surveillance by unarmed civilian aircraft." 79
It has been generally conceded that such observation 'vas not espionage in the conventional international sense. 80 Since peacetime international la 'v is remarkably devoid of content relating to conduct,
w·hich if engaged in during 'vartime might legitimately have been
regarded as espionage, 81 the Soviet response to the U-2 and RB-47
flights was to assert that such conduct was aggressive. It ''as the
Soviet vie'v that the conduct 'vas a violation of its sovereign frontiers
of airspace. 82 The Security Council refused to condemn the U -2
flight as aggressive by a vote of 9-2. 83 Although the Soviet Union
shot down the U-2, it did not claim or admit the right to shoot down
the RB-47 (United States aircraft), when "over the high seas, even
if it is a military aircraft -vvhich may be engaged in military reconnaissance." 84
Although international law has not interdicted the collection of
intelligence data in a given country 'vhen acco1nplished from the
high seas and from the airspace superjacent to the high seas, a state
-on security grounds-can punish the invasion of its airspace. Sanctions have been imposed 'vhether the infraction has been accomplished intentionally to obtain intelligence data or has been quite
accidental, and not involving the acquisition of data.
It has been someti1nes contended that the gathering of intelligence
data by satellite violates the basic principle of international law
Beresford, "Surveillance Aircraft and Satellites: A Problem of International Law," 27 The Journal of Air Law and Commerce 113 (1961).
8o Ibid.
81 Cohen, "Espionage and Immunity-Some Recent Problems and Developments," 25 Brit. Yb. Int'l L. 404 (1948); Cohen-Jonathan and l{ovar, "L'Espionage en Temps de Paix," 1960 Annuaire Francais De Droit International 238255 (1961).
82 Lissitzyn, supra note 34, at 136, 138-140.
83 U.N. Doc. S/4384, S/4385 and S/4406 (1960).
84 Lissitzyn, op. cit., 140.
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''hereby each sovereign state must respect the territorial integrity
and political independence of others. Thus, it has been suggested
that espionage in peacetime is a form of intervention 'vhich cannot
be legally justified "on the ground that it is carried on as part of a
crusade against communis1n." 85 The claim of a state to engage in
observational activities may be based on the fundan1ental doctrine
of self-defense or on its right to enjoy the condition of international
peace and security. Since the ''orld com1nunity possesses a decentralized decisional process, it is clear that such principles may be opposed
by Soviet claims based either on the duty of peaceful intercourse., or
nonintervention in internal affairs, or on their vie'v of self -defense,
peace, and security.
International la'v does not interdict all activities of a state 'vhich
are not appreciated by other states. It prohibits only such conduct
as has been agreed to be unlawful-either through custom, general
principles of la,v, or through express consent. Until custom or express agreement has been reached, holding nonaggressive observational activities to be unreasonable, it w·ill be per1nissible for states to
e1nploy inforn1ation gathering satellites.
It has been noted that the Soviet Union and the United States
have taken opposing views on the legality under international law
of one function of observational satellites. However, both have fashioned their approach to this subject by reliance on, and through,
seeking the benefit of the general principles of internationalla,v, the
Charter of the U.N., and in particular General Assembly Resolution
1721 (XVI). Both have taken into account the concepts of sovereignty, the right to international peace and security, and self-defense. The Soviets have made particular reference to such concepts
as territorial integrity, political independence, friendly international
relations, and peaceful intercourse. They have also specifically noted
the needs of peaceful cooperation and the humanitarian objectives
of mankind. It has been suggested, in support of the Soviet position,
that observational activities may constitute a form of intervention
violative of an alleged right of privacy. The Soviets have charged
that "espionage," at least if engaged in by means of an artificial satellite, is inherently "rrong, and have sought, 'vithout success, to support their vie,vs through reference to the Hague and Chicago Con\Yright, "Espionage and the Doctrine of Non-Intervention in Internal
Affairs," in Stanger, ed., Essays on Espionage and International Law .23
(19G2). Compare, Baxter, "So-Called 'Underprivileged Belligerency'-Spies,
Guerrillas, & Sabateurs," 28 Brit. Yb. Int'l L. 32D q.D51), where it is stated
that e~pionage ''is of doubtful compatibility with the requirements of law
go,·erning peaceful intercourse of states."
85

ventioris. They have also pointed to the fact that a state in its.
national legislation ·may prohibit the municipal crime of espionage.
'I'he United States, on the other hand, has interpreted General
Assembly Resolution 1721 as meaning that outer space is open to all
for peaceful exploration and use on the basis of equality. It hag;
pointed to the reasonableness of its observational activities and to·
the inconsistencies of the Soviet claim when compared with the conduct of the latter. 1"'he United States has relied on the analogy of
the high seas 'vhere freedom of observation is accepted. It has noted
that with the development of a custon1ary la 'v for outer space, state
practice has generally come to regard observational activities as.
peaceful, and that there have been no national protests on a formal
state-to-state basis against a specific instance o:f space observation.
The United States has also been able to rely on the :fact that international law-not being all-encompassing-has not arrived at any
specific inhibitions against reasonable observational activities. Such
activities have been held to be nonaggressive and in the greater interests of both states and mankind. On these facts it may be supposed
that such observational activities will be continued since they are
both la ,vful, nonaggressi ve, and generally beneficial.

D. THE SPECIAL SOVIET VIEW OF COMMUNICATIONS
ACTIVITIES
The Soviet draft declaration of basic principles of April 16, 1963,.
provided "5. The use of outer space for propagating war, national
or racial hatred or enmity between nations is inadmissible." 86 Paragraph 7 provided, in part, "All activities of any kind pertaining to
the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out solely by
States." 87
The Soviet purpose here, as previously, "\vas to provide an interpretation of the General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI), and to impose restrictions upon the free and peaceful use of outer space.
Their underlying concern-again based on the· expectation of maintaining a closed society-was that privately owned communications
facilities in the western world might be used to disseminate ideas
unacceptable to communist theory and practice within the Soviet
Union. Thus, although the Soviet proposal expressly referred to
certain kinds of propaganda, the purpose "\Vas to obtain the accept86 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.6, 2; U.N. Doc. A/ AC.105/12 Annex I, 5.
Annex 16, infra, ·pp. 466-468.
8'7 Ibid.
.
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ance of a principle upon 'vhich it 1night be urged that infor1nation
emanating fro1n the free 'vorld might be legally excluded from the
Soviet Union.
The Soviet delegate in explaining the purpose of the proposal
took into account 'vhat he considered to be the undesirable phel10lnena resulting fro1n private capitalist co1npetition as 'veil as certain achieYeinents of 1nodern technology. In urging against the
pro1notion and dissemination of "inhu1nan ideas," he noted that the
General Assembly had "envisaged that possibility in 1947, 'vhen it
had adopted Resolution 110 (II) on 1neasures to be taken against
propaganda and the inciters of a ne'v 'var." 88
''Then the co1n1nittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 1net in
Septen1ber 1963., the Soviet delegate n1ade only passing reference to
the fact that his government attached "considerable importance to
efforts finally to achieve agree1nent on the in1permissibility of the
use of satellites * * * for 'var propaganda and for propaganda connected with national and racial hatred and en1nity among people." 89
'The first reaction to the Soviet propaganda principle varied from
the belief that it was beyond the competence of the legal subcoinmittee to discuss it, to the vie'v that it ·went beyond international law,
and also to fir1n support of it. As 'vith the Soviet proposal dealing
".,ith "espionage," the states in the Communist Bloc 'vere its supporters, 'vhile the representatives from other states expressed opinions varying fro1n outright rejection to conditional approval. The
United States, as 'vith the proposal for prohibiting "espionage" by
satellite, expressed no opinion on the subject.
At the April-~fay 1963, legal subcom1nittee meeting it was the view
of the delegate of the UAR that the propaganda proposal "'vent beyond international law * * *" 90 The Italian delegate thought that
88 U.N. Doa. A/ AC.105/C.2/SR.17, 7 R~solution 110 (II) provided: "The General Assembly 1. Condetnns all forms of propaganda, in whatsoever country
conducted, which is either designed or likely to provoke or encourage any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression; 2. Requests the
Government of each l\Iember to take appropriate steps within its constitutional
limits: (a) To promote, by all means of publicity and propaganda available
to them, friendly relations among nations based upon the Purposes and Principles of the Charter; (b) To encourage the dissemination of all information
designed to give expression to the undoubted desire of all peoples for peace."
191/'1-1948 Yearbook of the UnUed Nations 93 (1949).
89 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.20, 46.
The more subdued positions of the Soviets,
in contrast to that expressed in the Spring of 1963, is reflected in the Soviet
delegate's statement to the committee. He observed that "Rapprochement on
questions which still remain to be settled may be achieved on the basis of
reasonable compromise and mutual concessions." Ibid.
90 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.18, 4.
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the proposal 'vent beyond the competence of the body and that the
injection of it ·would only lead to a conflict of opinion 'vhich might
limit affirmative progress in other areas. He observed that "Although
it was true that the proble1n of propaganda 'vas related to the use of
outer space because a space-ship 1night be equipped vvith transmitting
gear, the legal aspects of propaganda would not differ if the transmission 'vas received from a radio located on earth or conveyed
through a space-ship. The origin of the transmission was not the
point at issue." 91 This view 'vas supported by France, 92 Australia, 93
Argentina, 94 and the United J(ingdom. 95
Canada a.nd Brazil suggested alternative proposals. The Canadian
delegate suggested a principle formulated in positive terms, namely:
"States shall endeavor to direct their activities in outer space to,vards
the maintenance of international peace and security and the achieveInent of international co-operation and understanding." 96 Brazil
favored a specific agreement, in accordance with the principles of
the Charter, which "should prohibit any State from using global
telecommunications systems to intervene in the domestic affairs of
another State." 97 The United States simply adhered to its view that
international law was applicable to outer space activities. 98
On the other hand, the western bloc countries did not favor the use
of outer space as a forum for the dissemination of 'var propaganda
and incitement to national or racial hatred and discrimination. If,
as they agreed, the principles and rules of international law which
applied else"' here also applied in outer space, there 'vas no reason to
restate ackno,vledged limitations. 9
'fhe countries favoring the Soviet proposal urged the need for a
more positive inhibition upon the uses of outer space. This was the
vie'v of Czechoslovakia,100 and Hungary, 101 which specifically charged
that "The conduct of space activities, in any form, by private persons
or organizations 'vas therefore inconsistent with the principles of
!)

U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.20, 3.
.U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.22, 14. It opposed a state monopoly.
93 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.23, 6.
94 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.24, 10.
95 Ibid., 12.
96 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.21, 7.
The British representative noted that
91

92

this was an interesting proposal.
97 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.24, 7.
98 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.28, 9.
99 This was also the view of this Polish representative.
C.2/SR.19, 7.
1oo U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.20, 8.
1o1 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.26, 4.

U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/

298
international law * * *," 102 and Bulgaria which supported the Soviet
proposal on the ground that it 'vas humanitarian. 103 Albania maintained that the acceptance of the principle would lead to the conclusion of detailed agreements on such specific subjects as assistance
to astronauts in distress and liability for damage. 104 Romania upheld
the Soviet proposal on the ground that it would help to encourage
constructive international cooperation. 105 These debates resulted in
the incorporation of the following language into the unanimous General Assembly Resolution 1962 (XVIII) of December 24, 1963:
"Resolution 110 (II) of 3 November 1947, which condemned propaganda designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat tao
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and considering·
that the aforementioned resolution i$ applicable to outer space ..
* * *" 105 a Presumably such language has given to the Soviets one
additional assurance that outer space is to be used for peaceful, i.e.,.
nonaggressi ve and beneficial, purposes.
As the subcommittee concluded its April-l\1ay 1963 meetings, the
representative of the United States stated that if that body were to
succeed in bringing forth acceptable recommendations, its members
'vould have to be motivated to "engage in the give and take o£ international discourse and to make adjustments in their positions in
order to achieve a consensus." 106 Concerning the means by which
ideas might be disseminated, the answer o£ the Soviet representative
was that "Only States fully cognizant o£ their responsibilities should
be allowed to engage in space activities: to give private companies.
a free hand in outer space could lead to chaos and anarchy." 107
However, by September 1963, the Soviet Union had modified considerably its vie·ws that only national bodies might embark on outer
space programs. Thus, the Soviet representative told the Committee on Peaceful Uses o£ Outer Space that it 'vould be willing to
recognize the responsibility o£ international organizations for material damage caused by them during their space activities~ He noted
that "in the case o£ space activity being conducted by an international
organization, responsibility for both the implen1entation o£ the principles of the declaration and £or possible material damage caused on
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.21, 4.
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.23, 8.
104 U.N. Doc. A/AC.l05/C.2/SR.24, 3.
1o5 U.N. Doc. A(AC.l05/C.2/SR.26, 7.
105a See Annex 4, infra, pp. 450-452.
1oG U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.28, 9.
1o1 Ibid., 13.
1o2
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the earth or in space, 'vill be borne, together with the international
organization also by States participants in it." 108
Several days later the Soviets also ackno,vledged the permissibility
<>f private companies engaging in space activities when supervised or
controlled by their national governments. The Soviet delegate stated
that "it would be possible to consider the question of not excluding
:from the [Soviet] declaration [of principles] the possibility of
activity in outer space by private companies, on the condition that
such activity 'vould be subject to the control of the appropriate
State, and the State would bear international responsibility for it." 109
These more recent views of the Soviets indicate so1ne elasticity in
their conception of a suitable declaration of principles for national
.activity in outer space. This elasticity was reflected in the terms of
the unanin1ously adopted United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1962 (XVIII) of December 24, 1963. It made provision for con-ducting space activities by both governmental agencies and nongov-ernmental entities and stated in paragraph five that "the activities
-of nongovern1nental entities in outer space shall require authorization
:and continuing supervision by the State concerned."
The foregoing analysis of some of the conditions under which outer
space may be used has demonstrated a number of salient positions.
It has called attention to the need for an interpretation of the basic
principles contained in General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI)
·of December 20, 1961. It has also served to illustrate the problem of
moving in the direction of agreement on specific rules. The basic
problem, of course, is and will continue to be the extent to which
the uses of outer space will be free or limited. This directly affects
the substance of reasonable uses and unreasonable or unpermitted
uses. The Soviet Union, and the Comn1unist Bloc, have den1onstrated
their demands for a limitation on the free uses of outer space-going
beyond the bounds of practical reasonableness in the eyes of the western 'vorld. The negative approach was best illustrated by the statement of the Soviet delegate to the legal subcommittee on l\Iay 2,
1963. After charging that the United States had refused to support
~'the principle of equal rights for all States in the exploration and
use of outer space," 110 although the representative of the United
.S tates had previously made it clear that a consensus existed on the
principle of "the equality of rights of all States in the exploration
U.N. Doc. A/AC.l05/PV.20, 42.
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.22, 37. United States private satellite operations
:are discussed in 1 Astronautics and Aerospace Engineering 23-52 (September
1963).
no U.N. Doc. A/AC.l05/C.2/SR.27, 6.
108
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and use of outer space" 111 in accordance with international la,v, the
Soviet delegate concluded: "Nor unfortunately had there been agreenlent on the principle of the freedom of outer space, since difference
of opinion existed as to 'vhether that freedom should be absolute or
qualified." 112 Despite the unacceptability of the Soviet proposals
relating to the collection of intelligence data by observational satellite and those relating to limitations upon the substance and means
for the dissemination of ideas, there was a strong feeling among the
members of the subcommittee that certain uses of outer space were
unreasonable and therefore impermissible. Such uses have been characterized as nonpeaceful, i.e., aggressive and nonbeneficial.
E. RESTRICTIONS ON USES OF OUTER SPACE
The range of reasonableness, and therefore of permissibility, extends fro1n such generally accepted practices as the collection of scientific inforn1ation by satellite through the practice of collecting
intelligence data in the territory of a state to the unreasonable, and
hence i1npermissible, use of outer space and space vehicles for aggressive purposes. The United States has adopted the policy of not placing weapons possessing mass destruction capabilities in outer space
and as early as the 1962 debates in the Political Committee of the
United Nations, invited the Soviet United to conforn1 to the same
policy. 113 Efforts to obtain an understanding 'vith the Soviets respecting the presence of weapons of mass destruction stationed in
outer space have been influenced by common efforts to interdict, as
unreasonable, the testing of nuclear we a pons in outer space.
On April 18, 1962, the United States submitted a draft treaty on
General and Complete Disar1nament to nations endeavoring to reach
an accord on this subject. The American draft provided in part D
for Stage One that "The Parties to the Treaty ·would agree not to
place in orbit \veapons capable of producing mass destruction." 114
Article 15 of the Soviet proposal of March 28, 1962, for "General
and Complete Disarmament under Strict International Control" provided that "Rockets and space devices shall be launched exclusively
for peaceful purposes," and called for control teams from an international agency to be present "at launchings and thoroughly examine
111
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113 Senator Albert C. Gore, December 3, 1962.
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Compare, ?.Ieeker, "Observation in Space," Department of State Press Release
No. 191 (Revised), April12, 1963, 6.
114 46 Department of State Bulletin 747 (1962) ; 56 A.J.I.L. 906 (1962).
112

301
every rocket or satellite before launching." 115 And, prior to the
Soviet proposal, the United States on September 25, 1961, had subInitted a plan for general and complete disarmament to the United
Nations. In Stage I the proposal called for the prohibition of "the
placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of weapons capable
of producing mass destruction * * *" 116 The same proposal also
called for states to give advance notification to participating states
and to the International Disarmament Organization of "launchings
of space vehicles and missiles, together with the track of the
vehicle." 117
President l{ennedy called attention to the American position on
September 12, 1962, 'vhen he stated that ""'\Ve have vo,ved that we
shall not see space filled with weapons of mass destruction, but with
instruments of knowledge and understanding." 118 Pursuing this
goal, and immensely assisted by the conclusion of the l\1oscow Treaty
"banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and
under-water," 119 August 1963, Mr. l{ennedy in addressing the
United Nat ions on September 12, 1963, again laid emphasis on the
need to keep 'vea pons of mass destruction out of outer space. As the
18-nlember United Nations Disarmament Committee began to turn
its attention to drafting a resolution on this subject in October 1963,.
l\ir. l{ennedy again made the position of the United Stutes clear
'vhen he stated on October 9, 1963, that "The United States has
stated it would not put weapons in outer space. "'\Ve have no military
use for doing so and we would not do so." 120 It should also be noted
that the Soviet Foreign Minister had placed some e1nphasis on the
115
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The operative parts of the Treaty are contained in Article I, which in part
provided : "1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to
prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other
nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control: (a) in the
atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or underwater, including
territorial waters or high seas; or (b) in any other environment if such
explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits
of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. * * *
2. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from
causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any
nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which
would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect
referred to, in paragraph 1 of this Article." 49 Departnwnt of State Bulletin
239 (1963). The Treaty is set forth in Annex 19, infra, pp. 470-472.
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·need to a void positioning 'veapons of mass destruction in outer space
:in his Septen1ber 1963, address to the United Nations.
Prior to the unani1nous adoption by the Political Co1nmittee of the
United Nations on October 16, 1963, and the subsequent unanimous
·adoption of Resolution 1884 (XVIII) by the General Assembly on
·October 17, 1963,121 there had been discussions in the legal subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
·Outer Space on the need to avoid the positioning of such weapons
in outer space. These discussions 'vere carried on in the context of
fonnally interdicting nonpeaceful, i.e., aggressive and nonbeneficial,
uses of outer space. Thus, during the discussions carried out in the
legal subcommittee in the Spring of 1963, the representative of the
·united Arab Republic indicated that peaceful uses "~ould prohibit
·"the storage of 'veapons of mass destruction in artificial satellites
circling the earth, the placing of missiles on the n1oon or the establishment of military bases in outer space or on celestial bodies." 122
Among the uses of outer space which are currently under discus·sion, particularly in ter1ns of the reasonableness of the use, are the
"\Vest Ford projects of the United States. The second effort in 1963
succeeded in distributing a vast quantity of copper needles in a cir·cular orbit around the earth at an elevation of approxin1ately 2,000
miles. Such needles serve to trans1nit radio signals carrying voice,
-teletype, and high speed data. They have been designed to provide
an invulnerable co1nn1unications system "\vhich 'vould be almost im·pervious even to nuclear explosions.
The use of outer space as a dimension for the testing of nuclear
·devices has also been Inuch debated in terms of reasonableness and
hence permissibility. In all pre-J\1oscow treaty discussions the prob-lem of occasional-as opposed to frequent or continual-use had been
raised, and it has been urged that an occasional use of an otherwise
unpermitted form of conduct could fall within the range of reasonableness.123 J\Iany factors, of course, have to be weighed in arriving
at a conclusion as to the reasonableness, and hence permissible status,
·of such uses. 124
121 Supra, p. 264-268. Annex 13, infra. pp. 462-463.
122 U.N. Doc. A/.AC.105/C.2/SR.18, 4.
12 3 :McDougal and Schlei, "The Hydrogen Bomb Test in PerspectiYe, Lawful 1\leasures for Security," 64 Yale Law Journal 648 (1955). Compare,
l\Iargolis, "The Hydrogen Bomb Experiments and International Law," 64 Yale
Law Journal 629 (1055).
124 Infra, pp. 332-34!). It is clear that a unilateral breach of the terms of
the l\Ioscow Treaty would absolYe other signatories from the further obliga·. tion to conform to it.

303.

In seeking a policy as to the type of restrictions 'vhich ought to be
imposed 'vith respect to the uses of outer space, the United States
has been guided by man's vast exper-ience in the use of the seas. The·
law of outer space, by ''ay of partial analogy with the law of thehigh seas, has adopted the principle that such space is free for peaceful and reasonable uses. The United States has supported this result
on the ground that it permits the use of outer space free of any restraints except those of exclusive use and illegal activity, such as.
aggression. This position 'vas stated in large part by the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizational Affairs.
on l\1arch 12, 1962, when, in referring to General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI), he stated that "l\1fankind would thus be free to use·
space on the same basis as it uses the high seas-free of any restraint
except those on illegal activity, such as aggression and exclusive use.
This formula is designed to promote the n1aximum exploitation of
space technology in the service of human needs." 125 Thus, the purpose underlying the use of outer space has a direct bearing on
whether such uses or activities in outer space are to be considered
peaceful, reasonable, and lawful. The practical consequences of certain uses 'vill prove whether space activities serve human needs.
One of the most i1nportant considerations to be weighed in ascertaining the reasonableness of space conduct is 'vhether it is carried_
on openly after suitable advance notice to the world. President
ICennedy, in addressing the National Academy of Sciences on October 22, 1963, announced a policy for the conducting of outer space·
experiments involving potential risk to the space environment. Apparently 'vith the 'Vest Ford project and perhaps high-altitude nu-·
clear tests conducted in the Pacific in mind he stated:
The government has the clear responsibility to 'veigh the importance of large-scale experiments to the advance of kno,vledge
or to national security against the possibility of adverse and destructive effects. * * *
To deal with this proble1n, we have worked out formal procedures within the government to assure expert review before
potentially risky experin1ents are undertaken.
And we 'vill make every effort to publish the data needed to
125

Gardner, "Extending Law into Outer Space," Department of State PresB
Release, No. 159, l\farch 10, 1962; 56 A.J.I.L. 798-799 (1962). Compare Gardner,
"Cooperation in Outer Space," 41 Foreign Affairs 345 (1963) ; see also Gardner,
"Outer Space: A Breakthrough for International Law," 50 A.B.A.J. 30-33;
(January 1964).
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permit open discussion of proposed experiments by the scientific
com1nunity before they are authorized. 126
From these remarks it is clear that the United States proposes to
publish the reasons for large-scale scientific experi1nents in outer
space before they are finally authorized. This 'viii per1nit open examination and discussion of the proposed activities. However, the
President's remarks left open the possibility that such procedures
'vere not necessarily to be exclusive, and that in reality such procedures would not be follo,ved if the intended experiment involved
measures of significant importance to national security. To the extent that the world scientific community will be consulted prior to
e1nbarking upon new and different experiments, it is indeed likely
that the body of scientific opinion comprising COSPAR will be taken
into careful account. In the for1nulation of this policy it is also clear
that the United States has opened the way for other nations to conform to comparable practices. The establishment of an international
scientific consensus as to appropriate scientific practices will unquestionably 1naterially affect the substance of reasonable uses.
In vie'v of the fact it is difficult to identify the functions of
aircraft and spacecraft after they have left the ground, one approach
to the peacefulness or reasonableness of their missions has been to
suggest the development of registration and inspection procedures
for use prior to launch and flight. 127 The difficulty of ascertaining
the intended purposes of space vehicles, after launch~ may be coinpared 'vith the problem of determining the mission of aircraft while
in flight. This is particularly true when international tension is
high. During the 1962 Cuban crisis between the United States and
the Soviet Union, Mr. l(hrushchev wrote to President l(ennedy 'vith
regard to an American reconnaissance plane 'vhich appeared over the
Chukotka Peninsula on October 28: "Is it not a fact that an intrud126

New York Times, October 23, 1963; Christian Science },fonitor, October
24, 1963. The American position that the 'Vest Ford experiment was "planned
to avoid interference with other space activities and other scientific pursuits"
was set forth in a communication by Ambassador Stevenson to the Secretary
General of the U.N. on June 6, 1963. "United States Space Communications
Experiment," United States Aiission to the United Nations Press Release No.
1,.219, 1 (June 6, 1963).
127 The problem of arriving at information concerning nuclear test explosions
is not entirely dissilnilar. In this connection there has been agreement in principle between the United States and the Soviet Union that on-site inspections,
both by means of automatic seismic stations and human inspection, should take
place. See the exchange of letters of December 1D and 28, 1962, and of .January 7,
1963. "U.S. and U.S.S.R. Exchange Views on Nuclear Test Ban," 48 Department
oj State Bulletin 198-202 (1963).
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ing American plane can be easily taken for a nuclear bomber and
this 1night push us to a fateful step * * * ~" 128
I. Preliminary Assessment of Factors to he Considered in De-·
termining Whether Outer Space Is Being Used for Reasonable
Purposes

Reasonableness of use in the final analysis must depend on at least
three considerations, namely, the purpose or intent under lying the
use of the space vehicle, the specific factual context of a given international situation, and finally, the nature-including specific capabilities-of the vehicle itself. In some instances the very nature of the
vehicle, when, for example, it is an instrument of mass destruction,
would characterize its presence in outer space as an unreasonable
one. In other instances, intent would have to be linked to the inherent
·c apability of the vehicle in order to determine if it were to be employed for overtly aggressive purposes. In such situations the nature
{)f existing international relationships would have to be taken into
account in arriving at a decision as to the reasonableness of space
.conduct.
The presence of a weapon of mass destruction in outer space may
be considered to be both unreasonable and unlawful as well as being
destructive of the expectations relating to the peaceful uses of outer
space. The fact that the rna j or resource states have abstained from
the positioning of such a 'veapon in outer space suggests that there
is an awareness that such an act would be considered by the other as
an unpeaceful or aggressive one. Greater certainty would be achieved
through the acceptance of an express and formal agreement not to
place such weapons in outer space. However, such agreements would
serve only as express pro1nulgations of ongoing practices conceived
to be in the respective mutual interests of the resource states. If it
128

Text of lVfessage, New York Times, October 29, 1962. Jenks, in 1960,
noted that "mutual protection against surprise attack is the key to making
effective the exclusive dedication of space to peaceful purposes; the chief
danger of activities in space unleashing war on earth may well lie in some
inoffensive space vehicle being mistaken in a radar screen at a moment of
heightened international tension for an inter-continental ballistic missile which
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may be agreed that the presence of instru1nents of 1nass destruction
in outer space could serve no peaceful purpose, then the illegality of
placing such space vehicles in outer space is supported by General
Assembly Resolutions 1721 (XVI), 1802 (XVII), 1884 (XVII), and
1962 (XVIII).
2. Prelaunch Factors Affecting Reasonableness of Uses

a. Verification and Inspection
National intent to employ outer space for unreasonable uses may
be determined in t\vo ways. First, there may be an explicit claim to
engage in an unreasonable use. Second, in the absence of such an
explicit claim, and even in the presence of an explicit disclaimer that
such activity was not unreasonable, a state through its conduct might
engage in unreasonable space activities.
In order to arrive at international assurance that launched space
vehicles are not carriers of instruments of mass destruction, and to
provide evidence respecting the claim that other space vehicles are
designed and intended for reasonable, peaceful, and legal uses, it
has often been suggested that such space vehicles and their activities
be made the subject of verification and inspection.
Such verification and inspection may take two forms. The first
would consist of suitable examination prior to launch. The second,
and less effective and less likely to provide an ordered structure for
space activity, would be verification and inspection after launch. Prelaunch verification and inspection will be considered here. Postlaunch
problems will be discussed in the follo\ving chapter.
Proposals for some form of prelaunch inspection, either by nonnationals or by an international agency, have long been advocated.
One of the first was that of l\1cDougal, \vho prior to the IG Y and
the first Sputnik, urged that each state about to launch a satellite
should "register its intent to do so with an international agency, to
file a flight plan with such agency, and to file a description of the
satellite's load, " . eight, size, etc. It 1\rould of course be impractical
and not necessary to the proposal to include details of the launching
1nechanism, but complete information about the load could be registered and this could be done \vith respect to both recoverable and
nonrecoverable satellites. Beyond registrntion it might even be desirable as a guarantee of good faith to suggest inspection by the
international agency to assure that the load conforms to the description filed. A procedure of inspection need not, of course, include
sub1nission to prior approval." 129
129
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The U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,in its report of July 14, 1959, noted as a matter of priority the need
:for the identification and registration of space vehicles and co-ordination of launchings. 130 The report suggested the "necessity of providing suitable means for identifying individual space vehicles," and
.added that such "identification of space vehicles could be obtained
by agreement on an allocation of individual call-signs to these vehi.cles; the call-signs could be emitted at stipulated regular intervals,
at least until identification by other means had been established.
Another means of identification is by orbital or transit characteristics
of space vehicles." 131 The report, in addition to favoring registration,
also noted the importance of identification. It stated "Registration
might also afford a convenient means for the notification of launchings to other States, thus enabling them to make appropriate distinctions between the space vehicles so notified and other objects, and
to take appropriate measures to protect their interests if necessary." 132
The American Bar Association's Committee . on Law of Outer
Space, 1959, noted the importance of "nothing less than foolproof
international inspection and enforceable regulation of atomic activities * * *" if there were to be adequate conformity with the needs
of peace and security and the right of self-defense. 133 On this basis
the Committee recommended that there be developed an "appropriate
inspection and control system" for space activities. 134 The need for
such a system was based not only on security considerations, but was
also related to an orderly peaceful use of space. The latter would, of
course, be 1naximized through the "ad vance filing of flight plans and
coordination of launch times." 135
The merit of establishing prelaunch inspection and identification
procedures has also been justified in practical terms. It is probable
at this time that a more meaningful inspection would be accomplished
on the ground than after the vehicle had been placed in orbit. Ho,vever, the former approach has been resisted by states, particularly
the Soviet Union, on the basis that it might carry with it collateral
13 0
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reconnaissance of launching sites and attendant espionage. It has
been pointed out that "vVith the possible exception of inspecting
vehicles at launching sites, inspection in outer space may be less of'
an invasion of privacy or of national sovereignty than inspection of
weapons on the ground." 186 Sovereignty does not extend to outerspace.
The serious difficulties attendant upon the verification and inspection of nuclear tests conducted by one state are similar to the prob-·
lems involved in the launching of space vehicles. Thus, for reasons:
of sovereignty, security and self-defense, seasoned by the Soviet's.
large passion for secrecy, it has not been possible to arrive at a
process for prelaunch inspection and identification of artificial satellites. It may be suggested, however, that an international agreement
requiring international inspection and identification prior to launch
would serve many useful purposes. In the first place, such inspection
and identification process would quickly ascertain whether the space
vehicle were equipped with instru1nents of mass destruction, and
might either :forestall the launch or publicize the nature and legality
of the satellite. Secondly, by imposing a duty to submit to prelaunch
inspection and identification, it would be possible to establish a presumption that vehicles in orbit which had not been inspected and
identified prior to launch were being employed for an unreasonable
and nonpeaceful purpose. Thirdly, the prelaunch inspection and
identification would grant to the launching state the right to contend
that the launch was both reasonable and peaceful and thus shift the
burden of proof to show the contrary upon those seeking to prove
that the use was unreasonable and nonpeaceful. In short, prelaunch
inspection and registration would permit the establishment of a
prima facie case that the launch was both reasonable and peaceful,
and, therefore, legal. Space vehicles in orbit, which could not offer
evidence of prelaunch inspection and registration, on the other hand,.
""ould presumably be designed for unreasonable and nonpeaceful
purposes, and states offended by their presence would be entitled to
exercise legal rights to achieve and maintain international peace,.
security, and self-defense. 137
Although it might be supposed that a system of prelaunch inspection and registration, particularly when conducted by a suitable international organization, might have much to commend it, there was
Schelling, "The :Military Use of Outer Space, with Particular Reference
to Bombardment Satellites," in Goldsen, ed., Outer Space 44 (1960).
137 Infra, pp. 319-331.
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no possibility of writing such a provision into General Assembly
Resolution 1721 (XVI). However, Part B of that Resolution did
contain a provision calling upon states, in order to further the peace-ful exploration and use of outer space, to submit information on
national launches on a voluntary basis. The R-esolution called upon
states "launching objects into orbit or beyond to furnish information
promptly to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
through the Secretary-General, for the registration of launchings." 138
The Resolution also called upon the Secretary-General to maintain
a public registry of the information furnished by member states.
This function is being performed by the Se.cretary -General who after
receipt of reports from the United States and the Soviet Union
publishes and distributes the data received. 139
The United States has reported vehicles launched into orbit or
beyond under the following headings: international designation,
launch vehicle, satellite category, date of launch, nodal period, in-:
clination, apogee and perigee in kilometres. It has also furnished_
supplemental information relating to vehicles which did not achieve.
orbit or those which no longer ren1ain in orbit. United States satellite categories have been designated as "A" for development of space.
flight techniques and technology, "B" for space research and exploration, "C" for practical applications of space based technology, and
"D" for nonfunctional objects.
The Soviet Union has made reports concerning launchings of.
artificial earth satellites and space objects. It has assigned to them
serial numbers, names, the purpose of launching, date of launch,
perigee, apogee and inclination of orbit. Typical purposes assignee(
to launches have been the investigation of the upper atmosphere and.
outer space, physical study of the atmosphere, research in upper.
atn1osphere and in outer space, attainment of escape velocity and
exploration of interplanetary space, and medical and biological re-.
search under space flight conditions. It is possible that these respective reports constitute opposing claims as to the presence of atmosphere and the existence of a line or lines separating airspace from
outer space. Thus, using for illustrative purposes the satellites which
have maintained effective perigees at about 100 statute miles-the .
lowest reported at the time of this writing-the United States has
described such space flights as Category A, namely development of ·
U.N. Doc. A/5100. Infra, pp. 443-446.
These appear as U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/INF.1. et. seq. The United States
and the Soviet Union have filed reports periodically since l\1arch 7, 1962.
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.space flight techniques and technology. 140 Ho,-vever, the first n1a1uted .
.space flight undertaken by the United States:t niercury-Atlas 6 (1962
Ga1nma) of February 20, 1962, was described by the United States
:a s one "launched into earth orbit" and "after four hours and 43
minutes the spacecraft re-entered the atmosphere and landed * * *" 141
The Soviet reports to the United Nations on 1nanned space flights,
Vostok 1 through 4, have been described as spaceship satellites, and
the purpose of the launch has been described in scientific terms, such
as human functioning under conditions of weightlessness, conduct
<>f scientific observations, and improvement of functional systen1s. 142
On the other hand, Soviet space vehicles, described by the1n as "satellites," or "sputniks" of the Cosmos variety, have maintained perigees
varying from about 110 to 168 statute 1niles. Soviet reports to the
United Nations have consistently described the purposes of these
launchings to be "investigation of the upper atn1osphere and outer
space." 143 The Soviets have not, however, urged on the basis of this
language that in a legal sense there is a boundary between airspace
and outer space at such heights. In may be noted:t also, that there
is a belief that the Cosmos type satellite may be earth, as "~en as
space, oriented in its observational capabilities. 144
b. Exchange of Infor·mation Relating to Outer Space A_cti1·ities
Resolution 1721 B (XVI) also requires a close coordination between the U.N. and governmental and nongovernmental organizations concerned with outer space matters. To the end that there
might be every encouragement to international cooperation in the
peaceful exploration and use of outer space, the Resolution made
provision for the "exchange of such information relating to outer
space activities as Govern1nents may supply on a voluntary basis,
supplementing but not duplicating existing technical and scientific
exchanges." 145 States have regularly submitted such reports, and the
materials have been widely distributed. General Assembly Resolution
1802 II (XVII) of December 19, 1962, has taken into account the
This was true for the manned 1\Iercury-Atlas 7 ( 1962 Tau 1) :flight on
1\Iay 24, 1962, the manned 1\Iercury-Atlas 8 (1962 Beta Delta 1) flight on
October 3, 1962, and the manned l\Iercury-Atlas 9 (1963 15A) on l\Iay 15,
1963. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/INF.10; U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/INF.21; FJ.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/INF.40.
141 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/INF.3, 4.
142 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/INF.2, 7; U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/INF.18, 2.
143 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/INF.18, 3; U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/INF.36, 2.
144 The New York Times, l\Iay 27, 1963.
145 U.N. Doc. A/5100." The Secretary-General of the U.N. bas reported •regu·
larly on the received data. U.N. Docs. A/5109, A/5201/Add.1 2, A/ AC.105/11/
Add.1. to Add 3.
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receipt of such data from many states and expressed the view that
other states and regional and international organizations having
space programs should :furnish the U.N. with such in:formation. 146
Such reports contain descriptions o:f national space programs and
provide numerous examples of reasonable, peaceful and legal uses
of outer space. The examples deal almost exclusively with scientific
investigations being conducted in outer space.
A Soviet commentator has emphasized the :fact that Resolution
1721 B (XVI) is not mandatory and that it deals only with the reporting of postlaunch data. In noting that Part B of the Resolution
refers to the need for prompt reporting of launches, Korovin has concluded that this "means subsequent and not advance registration;
nor does the article specify the scope of information to be submitted
on registration, 'vhich is determined by the state voluntarily making
the registration." 147 The need to provide an orderly regime for the
peaceful use of outer space has been considered by 1nany commentators. The following is a representative opinion:
As satellite traffic increases, it will be necessary to arrive at
juridico-technical agreements for the creation of a central registration and data processing agency. This 'vill also permit the
establishment of the orbital elements which, in turn, will assist
in identifying individual satellites.
"\Vithout precise legal stipulations providing in advance of
launching for full information about such items as the nationality of all space vehicles, their anticipated launching dates and orbital paths, their radio codes for transmission and reception of
data, their agreed upon equipment and instrumentation, and certain 'markings' permitting identification of space vehicles in
orbit and after re-entry, the risk of miscalculation and ensuing
human disaster will soon be real. 148
The Japanese representative to the legal subcom1nittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space has suggested that a nonlaunching state need not be obliged to return a space vehicle or its
parts unless· it had been provided with advance information concerning the vehicles in transit or in orbit. He stated that "The obligation of non-launching States to return space vehicles should be
conditioned upon the obligation of launching States to provide adequate information in adva.nce. The information might be supplied
146

U.N. Doc. A/RES/1802 XVII). Annex 3, infra, pp. 446-450.
Korovin, "Peaceful Cooperation in Space," International Affairs (Jfoscolc)
63 (March 1962) .
148
Schick, "Space Law and National Security," International Affair8 (Moscow) 58 (March 1962) .
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through bilateral channels
connection, the timing and
der the registration system
tion 1721 B (XVI) might

or by other appropriate means. In that
contents o:f the information provided unestablished by General Assembly Resolube improved." 149

c. Natio1Ull Consultation and Oooperati()n a8 to Purportedly Un-

desirable Space Uses
In keeping with the premise contained in Resolutions 1721 (XVI),
1802 (XVII), and 1962 (XVIII) that international cooperation
should play a large role in the peaceful use and exploration o:f outer
space, several states have made proposals :for consultation and co·ordination regarding national space programs so that space \Yould
not be used :for unreasonable purposes. Such suggesti~ns have been
advanced to a1neliorate the situation created by :failure to reach
agreement on prelaunch inspection and registration. Thus, the 1963
Soviet Draft Declaration o:f the Basic Principles Governing the
Activities o:f States in the Exploration and Use o:f Outer Space,
Paragraph 6, called :for:
.
Co-operation and mutual assistance in the conquest o:f outer
space shall be a duty incumbent upon all States; any measures
that might in any \Yay hinder the exploration or use o:f outer
space :for peaceful purposes by other countries may be implemented only after prior discussion o:f and agreement upon such
measures betw·een the countries concerned. 150
The Soviet representative to the legal subcommittee introduced his
re1narks on Paragraph 6 by stating that the entire Soviet draft reflected a number o:f vie,~s contained in the 1962 Draft Declaration o:f
Principles Relating to the Exploration and Use o:f Outer Space previously submitted by the United States. 151 He made specific reference
to such principles as "the co1nmon interest o:f all mankind in the
progress o:f the exploration and use o:f outer space :for peaceful purposes, the use o:f such exploration :for the betterment o:f m~nkind and
o:f States, irrespective o:f their degree o:f economic or scientific development, and the role o:f co-operation in the use o:f outer space in the
development o:f mutual understanding and the strengthening of
:friendly relations bet\veen nations and peoples." 152
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.22, 12.
150 U.N. Doc. A/ AC.100/C.2/L.6, 2; U.N. Doc. A/ AC.105/12, Annex I.
1 5 t U.N. Doc. A/ AC.105/12, Annex I 9-10. U.N. Doc. A/0.1/881. Annex 10,
infra, pp. 459-460.
1 5 2 U.Y. Doc. A/ AC.105/C.2/SR.17, 6.
These views are contained in the preamble to the United States draft. See U.N. Doc. A/0.1/881. Annex 10, intra,
pp. 459-460.
149
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The Soviet delegate noted that his country's draft 153 proclaimed
extensive rights for peaceful activities in outer space, but that there
was a need to protect states and the international community as a
whole against the abuse of such rights. He stated: "The idea of the
:f~ee access of all States to outer space did not mean that States were
free to engage in measures which might hinder other countries in
their exploration or use of outer space for peaceful purposes. Outer
space might be used for undesirable purposes and Paragraph 6 of
the Soviet draft therefore mentioned the principle of prior discussion and agreement between the countries concerned." 154 He then
referred to the role of COSPAR and the work of a subcommitte of
the Inter-Parliamentary Union, and in particular to his country's
concern lest experiments in outer space produce harmful effects and
thereby interfere with the peaceful use of space. 155
The Soviet delegate supported his views by referring to the 1962
Draft Declaration of Basic Principles Governing the Activities of
States Pertaining to the Exploration and Use of Outer Space of the
United l(ingdom, which had been previously circulated to the members of the committee. 156 Paragraph 1 of the British draft after
noting the principle that "Outer Space and celestial bodies are free
for exploration and use by all States in conformity 'vith international law" 157 proceeded to enumerate four specific instances of the
peaceful and reasonable use of such areas. The draft included within
this category the provision:
This freedom shall include free navigation by means of space
vehicles, the establishment of space stations and other like devices, the conduct of scientific research, and the landing on and
exploration of celestial bodies, and shall be exercised by all States
with due regard to the interests of other States in the exploration and use of outer space, and to the need for consultation and
co-operation between States in relation to such exploration and
use.15s
It has always been difficult to derive acceptable operational rules
and procedures from commonly accepted principles. 'Vith regard to
outer space no disagreement has existed respecting the needs to use
outer space for peaceful and beneficial purposes. Neither has there
been much doubt as to the need to achieve international cooperation
so that national benefits and interests might be maximized. There
153 Annex 10, infra, pp. 459-460.
154 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.17, 6.
155 Ibid.
156 U.N. Doc. A/0.1/879 ; U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/12, Annex I 8. Annex 18,
infra, pp.469-470.
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158 Ibid.
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has been general agree1nent that nonpeaceful, i.e., aggressive, uses
of outer space \Yere not permissible. But there has existed disagreement as to the procedures which "~ould best contribute to the
realization of the desired goals. Specifically, by the end of 1964 there
was no precise agreement as to how possible future abuses of the
peaceful use of outer space could be controlled. The Soviet proposal
called for prior discussion and agreement respecting possible misuses
of outer space. The British draft called for consultation and cooperation on the part of resource states prior to engaging in launches
which might be detrimental to the benefits and interests of mankind.
Although the British proposal gathered more support than did that
of the Soviets, neither procedure has become mandatory.
The representative of the United States in 1963, noted that there
had been a narrowing of differences and. a clarificaion of viewpoints.
He cited the fact that the United ·States, along with other states, had
''endorsed the idea of appropriate international consultation on problems of interference and contamination in outer space and of providing for discussion of particular proposed projects." 159 In view of
the continual United States support for the principle that "exploration and use of space should be carried out for the benefit and in the
interest of all mankind * * *" 160 it recognized the need "for consultation and co-operation between States* * *"to avoid harmful conduct
in outer space. 161 In this connection it \Yas recalled that COSPAR
in April 1962, had created a consultative group "to study the problem
of har1nful experin1ents in outer space and to serve as a means for
consultation and discussion. The United States, which was continuing to consult the international scientific community on n1atters of
common interest in the field of space science, welcomed the establishment of the consultative group." 162
159
160
161

U.N. Doc. A/.A.C.105/C.2/SR.28, 9.
U.N. Doc. A/ AC.105/C.2/SR.16, 4.
U.N. Doc. A/.A.C.105/C.2/SR.20, 11.

162 Ibid. The consultative group is the Committee on Contamination in ExtraTerrestrial Exploration (CETEX). Jenks has noted that "unless clear rules
on these matters exist from the outset and are strictly applied, space research
will not yield the fruits which we are entitled to expect from it." Jenks, "The
International Control of Outer Space," Third Colloquium 9.
On l\Iay 28, 1963, the Soviet Union delivered to the Secretary-General a
document entitled "Dangerous United States Activities in Outer Space," in
which it was asserted that the 'Vest Ford project was impeding the peaceful
uses of outer space. U.N. Doc. A/AC.l05/13. On June G, 1963, the United
States submitted to the UN a detailed statement relating to the 'Vest Ford
project in which it was pointed out that it was undertaken only after worldwide scientific opinion had been received and only after the United States
''was fully confident that it would not have an adverse effect on any other
acti\·ity." U.N. Doc. A/AC.103/15, 7; United States j}fission to the United N ations, Press Release No. 1,219, June 6, 1963.
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This position had been explained in December 1962, to the First
Committee of the UN by Senator Gore. He had noted that :
The problems of possible harmful effects of space experiments
are difficult at best. They must be studied by competent and objective scientific bodies. To this end we welcome the creation of
a consultative group £or this purpose by the International Committee on Space Research, COSPAR. The United States will
continue to conduct its space programme with a high sense of
responsibility in this respect, making available to the world scientific community, both before and after the experiments which
it conducts, as much scientific data as is possible. We trust that
others will do the same. 163
In order to insure that the space program of the United States might
be as open and cooperative as possible, it has reported its launchings
to the U.N. It has also made an "extensive and factual report on our
space programme and plans to COSPAR every year." 164
d. Elimination of Potentially Harmful Outer Space Ewperiments
The Australian representative to the legal subcommittee pointed
to general concern for the elimination o£ harmful experiments in
outer space, and noted that the Soviet proposal o£ prior agreement
'vould give one state "an actual veto on a State's proposed space
activities." 165 In view of the unlikelihood that either resource state
would be willing to be confined by such a restriction, the Australian
representative suggested that a proposed potentially harmful use
might be linked explicitly with COSPAR's consultative group. He
also noted that the duty of states to "consult in the event of a potentially harmful experiment seemed to be either explicity or implicity * * *" a common characteristic o£ the British and Soviet draft
proposals. 166 He also held that the 1962 draft of the UAR which
called for state activities in outer space to take into account the safety
o£ astronauts and to "be confined solely to the peaceful uses" 167 supported the same conclusion.
During the April-May 1963, U.N. debates, the representative of
the U AR, in accepting the princi pie of the free use o£ outer space
for peaceful purposes, expressed the view that such "freedom should
be qualified and limited so as to provide guarantees against abuse." 168
U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1289, 17.
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Ibid., 18-20.
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U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.23, 6.
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A form of such abuse would be an unnecessary interference with the
safety of outer space. In this connection he stated that "some procedure should be found to prevent further experiments which might
have harmful effects and prejudice the sane development of. science
in space. He referred in particular to the high altitude nuclear tests
which had resulted in the disruption of the Van Allen belt and increased the potential danger of manned space flight." 169 This view
v;as supported by the Indian representative, who added, however, the
exception that "On rare occasions, a major experiment of such a type
n1ight be so important as to be desirable in the interests of science,_
but it shoula first be discussed and cleared." 170 Implicit in his remarks 'vas the view that such discussion and clearance would be that
of states and not of an international scientific organization, such as
the consultative committee of COSPAR. Ho,veYer, he recognized
the usefulness of the latter group.
Other representatives had noted during 1962, the possible role of
the consultative committee of COSPAR in assisting in determining
in advance the potential dangers of space experiments. The Canadian
delegate stated that he "welcomed the staten1ent that the United
States considered it desirable to have some international agreement
on consultation regarding experiments in outer space 'vhich might
have harmful effects and the suggestion that the consultative group
established by COSPAR might serve as an appropriate instrument
of consultation." 171 He was joined by the Austrian delegate in stating that the participants had achieved a considerable rapprochement
concerning the need for prior consultations relating to experi1nents
affecting outer space. 172
In commenting on Pargaraph 6 of the Soviet proposal, the Polish
representative in 1963, noted that so1ne scientists previously had underestimated the harmful result of space experi1nents. In order to
a void such hazards in the future, he opined that there should be
"close cooperation and consultation between the States concerned." 173
He did not, however, advocate the Soviet proposal of prior agreement. The Czechoslovakian representative, on the other hand, supported the Soviet vie'v that there should be prior international consultation and agreement before the introduction of potentially dangerous materials into outer space 'vas permitted. He stated that such
a step 'vould "serve to guarantee the princi pie of national security
Ibid., 5.
U.N. Doc. A/AC.l05/C.2/SR.22, 7.
1n U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.27, 5.
172 U.N. Doc. A/ AC.105/C.2/SR.28, 3.
173 U.N. Doc. A/ AC.105/C.2/SR.19, 7.
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and the maintenance of equal rights for all States. Any launching
or space experiment undertaken without such consultation and agreement should be prohibited. In that connection, his delegation was
distressed at reports that space experiments which had been viewed
w·ith misgiving in many quarters might be repeated." 174 He also
noted, as had the Soviet representative earlier, that the "Inter-Parliamentary Union's sub-commission on the law of outer space had
recently voiced disapproval of space projects that did not meet international criteria of acceptability." 175
By the close of 1963, the Soviet Union had not departed from its
view that space experiments must depend upon prior discussion of
and agreement upon such measures between the countries concerned.
In rejecting the proposal of the United Kingdom that such experiments be based on consultation and cooperation, the Soviet delegate
in April1963, referred to the need for a very serious approach to the
problem. He urged that it vvas not enough "merely to require prior
consultation concerning such experiments; the essential need was
for prior agreement." 176
No effort was made to delineate the meaning of "countries concerned," and it may well be that the Soviet Union, as suggested by
the Canadian representative, took the view that one state might veto
space experiments. The Soviet position has not been accepted. Clear
evidence of this exists in Paragraph 6 of General Assembly Resolution 1962 (XVIII) of December 24, 1963. This paragraph provides:
6. In the exploration and use of outer space, States shall be
guided by the principle of co-operation and mutual assistance
and shall conduct all their activities in outer space with due regard for the corresponding interests of other States. If a State
has reason to believe that an outer space activity or experiment
planned by it or its nationals would cause potentially harmful
interference with activities of other States in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, it shall undertake appropriate international consultations before proceeding with any such activity or experiment. A State which has reason to believe that an
outer space activity or experiment planned by another State
'vould cause potentially harmful interference with activities in
the peaceful exploration and use of outer space n1ay request consultation concerning the activity or experiment. 177
174
175
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Even before the unanimous adoption of the foregoing paragraph,
the Soviet Union, aware that its effort to obtain a veto over space
experiments was not acceptable, called for states to "comply strictly
with the provisions of General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI)
concerning registration of space flights." 178 Other successful, and
impressive, limitations upon the use of outer space for harmful or
potentially harmful uses are reflected in the l\foscow Treaty, 1963,179
and the General Assembly Resolution 1884 (XVIII) 180 relating to
the positioning of 'veapons of mass destruction in outer space.
Thus, it will be seen at the present time there is no disagreement
respecting the need for peaceful and reasonable uses of outer space.
There is no disagreement as to the need for international cooperation
in ascertaining the nature of free and reasonable uses of such space.
There is, however, no con1plete agreement as to what constitutes free,
peaceful, and reasonable uses. Nor is there complete agreement as
to the nature of restrictions which may be reasonably placed on the
free and peaceful uses of outer space. There is being developed, however, a consensus both with respect to the meaning of free and peaceful uses. Thus, it is possible to develop, and there is developing,
some meaning as to limitations upon the uses of outer space. However, these important goals are handicapped by the failure of states
to agree as to the appropriate procedures to be employed in determining in specific instances what activities are beneficial and in the general interest of mankind and what activities are truly harmful.
Despite these serious difficulties, it has, nonetheless, been possible for
states working through the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space and other Committees of the United Nations to arrive at important and specific areas of agreement concerning space activities.
The Resolutions of the General Assembly have contributed substantially to an understanding of space uses.
After first calling attention to the legal rights possessed by states
to maintain international peace, security, and to engage in self-defense in outer space, an analysis will next be n1ade of areas of rapprochement and consensus regarding legal uses of outer space.
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.25, 13.
Annex 19, infra, pp. 470-472.
180 Annex 13, infra, pp. 462-463.
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